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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for murder, a first degree felony,
and obstructing justice, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
At 10:20 a.m. on June 5, 2011, Defendant made an anonymous 911 call
from Angela Jen.kin's apartment and reported that a wmnan was not
breathing.

Defendant did not rnention that the woman, Angela, had

stopped breathing two hours earlier. Nor did he mention that Angela had
stopped breathing because he strangled her. Rather, Defendant hung up
the phone, left the aparhnent door slightly ajar, and fled.

Minutes later, police opened Angela's door to find her body in a state
of rigor mortis on the floor by her bed. Her face was swollen and purple
with bruises. She also had bruises all over her body, a broken nose, seven
broken ribs, and lips torn from her gums.

Police found damp bloody

towels, smudges on the bedroom walls where blood had been wiped away,
and signs of blood wiped off the bathroom sink, tub, and floor.
Three hours later, police tracked Defendant down at a friend's house.
In the police interview that followed, Defendant admitted that he had
punched, slapped, kicked, and strangled Angela for several hours before
she died. According to Defendant, Angela bled a lot, and the bloody towels
and blood in the bathroom were from his attempts to stop the bleeding.
Defendant claimed that after strangling Angela for the last time, he fell
asleep for two hours.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

At trial, Detective Reyes testified without objection to the

ad1nissions Defendant made in his police interview. On cross, Defendant
tried to elicit his hearsay explanation for why he had attacked Angela- that
she had repeatedly told him she was having an affair with his brother.
Defendant argued that his explanation was admissible under rule 106, Utah
Rules of Evidence, to clarify his admissions and to support his otherwise

-2-

G

i~

unsupported extreme emotional distress mitigation defense. The trial court
excluded the explanation as self-serving and unreliable hearsay that fell
outside the scope of rule 106.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's
self-serving hearsay explanation for why he killed his girlfriend was not
admissible under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence?

Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling under
rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, for abuse of discretion. See State v. Jones,
2015 UT 19, ,r,r12, 36-42, 345 P.3d 1195.
2. Was evidence that Defendant tried to clean up the blood in the

murder victim's apartment sufficient to support his obstructing justice
conviction?

Standard of Review.

In sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, this

Court views all "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT
46, ~177, 299 P.3d 892 (citation omitted). This Court "will not reverse a jury
verdict" so long as "some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find that the ele1nents of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendu1n A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2009) (murder);
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-205.5 (West Supp. 2009 (special mitigation);
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-306 (West Supp. 2009) (obstructing justice);
Utah R. Evid. 106.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of facts.

Mary Alice White lived with her 1nother in a second-floor apartment
in Millcreek. R748:45,56-57. Angela Jenkins, Defendant's girlfriend, lived
directly above them. R748:46,57;R749:74.
On May 4, 2011, Mary retired to her bedroom soon after 11:00 p.m.
R748:46.

Almost immediately, Mary heard noise and walking around

upstairs.

R748:46-47,51.

Then, it sounded like the people upstairs were

having sex. R748:47,53.
Around 1:00 a.in., the sounds upstairs changed. R748:48,51. Mary
heard pounding,

11

some muffled yelling, some grunting, and then smne
II

running around here and there." R748:48,51,53. She also heard a lot of
crying, 1nore so like despair." R748:48,51,53. The person yelling was am.an,
although Mary could not make out what he was yelling. R748:48. "The
crying was definitely a female." R748:49.
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Although Mary tried to fall asleep, "the noise was so loud from
upstairs" that she couldn't. R748:49,58. Finally, between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00
a.m., Mary woke up her mother Blenda and asked her to call the police.
R748:49-50.
Instead, Benda waited, listening to the noise for about two hours.
Then, Blenda heard "a boom, boom, boom, boom, oooh, oooh" that scared
her. R748:57-59. She tried to call Angela several times. R748:57-59. When
no one answered, Blenda went upstairs and knocked on Angela's door,
again to no avail. R748:60. After repeating that process several timescalling Angela and then going upstairs and knocking on her door- Blenda
knew "something" was "wrong." At 5:49 a.m., Blenda finally called 911.
R748:62,64,124. The noise from upstairs continued for another 30 minutes
before it got a little quiet. R748:62-63.
Around 6:35 a.m., Officers Alan Morley and Ronnie Prescott were
dispatched to Angela Jenkins' apartment on an "active domestic dispute."
R748:68. When they arrived at Angela's door about five minutes later, they
listened for sound, but it was very quiet. R748:71. Morley knocked on the
locked door several tiines- each tiine louder- but no one answered.
R748:71.,73,77.

Telephone calls to Angela's number went to voice mail.

R7488:72. Morley cleared the call and left around 7:00 a.m. R748:75.
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Although there was a brief period of silence upstairs, Mary heard
noise almost until she left for work. R748:55. By the time she left at 8:15
a.m., however, "it was dead silent." R748:55.
About 10:00 a.m., Defendai:t called his friend Roger Gary Warner
from Angela's aparbnent and asked Roger to pick him up.

R748:90-

92;R749:92,98. Twenty minutes later, Defendant made an anonymous 911
call from Angela's aparbnent and said that he needed an ambulance
because a woman wasn't breathing. R748:126-27,130,134. Defendant hung
up, left the door to Angela's apartment slightly ajar, and met Roger in the
parking lot. R748:76,94;R749:13. Defendant again called 911 anonymously
about five minutes later from a 7-Eleven across the street from Angela's
aparbnent.

R748:100-01,131.

After briefly stopping at an ex-girlfriend's

house, Defendant went to Roger's home.

R748:101.

On the way there,

Defendant told Roger that he thought he might have killed Angela.
R748:97. At Roger's house, Defendant took off his bloody pants and socks
and took a nap. R748:102.
The fire department, ambulance, and Officers Morley and Prescott
arrived at Angela's apartment within minutes of Defendant's 911 calls.
R748:141.

Finding the door ajar this time, the officers a1mounced

themselves and went inside. R748:79. In the living room, they found a
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pillow with what appeared to be blood on it. R748:79;R749:15. In a back
bedroom, they found blood spatter on the wall and Angela, partially
clothed and badly beaten, lying on the floor by the bed. R748:79-80,143.
Fire medics confirmed that Angela was dead. R748:83,143. They saw
"obvious signs of rigor mortis" -the stiffening of muscles that slowly
begins after death. R748:143.159,160. One of those signs-one of Angela's
arms was "independently staying up" -indicated that she had died at least
two hours earlier and that either she or something around her had been
moved since her death. R748:143.159,160;R749:16-17.
Officers found a pink bag in the kitchen sink and another near
Angela's body. R749:15. They found a hole in the sheetrock over the bed
that "looked like something had gone through [it] a couple of times."
R749:17,24. They also found in the bedroon1 a pillowcase that "had quite a

bit of blood on it," several blood spots on the mattress, and "quite a bit" of
blood splatter on the wall. R749:17.
The color of the blood on the wall "see1ned a little off," like it had
been diluted. R749:17,21,23. The light switch also seemed to have diluted
blood on it. R749:18. Police found "a lot" of bloody clothes and towels
piled up in the hamper that looked like they had been saturated with water.
R749:17-18,21. Near Angela's legs, they found wadded-up bloody and very
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wet gauze, a bottle of peroxide and a spray bottle of antiseptic, and a pink
hospital wash basin with blood in it. R749:18-20,22,28.
In Angela's bathroom, police found signs of blood in both the sink
and bathtub. R749:32-33. In addition, it looked like someone had tried to
wipe blood off the floor, vanity, and bathtub. R749:34-35,37-38.

Defendant's confession. By about noon, officers h·acked Defendant
down at Roger's house, although no one responded to their beating on the
door, screaming, and using a loud speaker for an hour and a half.
R748:104;R749:4-6. Finally, Roger left the house around 1:30 p.m. R749:6.
He told police that his intent was to lead the police away from the house
and then talk Defendant into meeting Roger later so that Defendant could
turn himself in. R749:121.
It took negotiators another two hours to convince Defendant to come
out.

R749:6.

R749:9.

When he did, he was not wearing either pants or socks.

Police recovered his blood-stained pants and socks later from

Roger's house. R749:7.
Because Defendant told police that he had ingested 17 methadone
pills, police took him to a hospital for treatment. R749:119. Defendant was
also treated for a broken finger, which Defendant said he broke by
punching the wall. R749:90.
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Detective Reyes interviewed Defendant a few hours after his arrest.
('.},.

',{fU

R749:120. Defendant said that he and Angela had been in a relationship for
about six months. R749:94. Defendant admitted having a fight with Angela
the night before, where he "slapped her" and "thumped her." R749:81-82.
Defendant acknowledged "that it went farther than it should have."
R749:81-82.

Defendant said that the fight began when he "got mad at"

Angela," and that he "pulled her hair," "slapped her," "choked her a little
bit," and that "it was over from there." R749:82-83.
But then, Defendant admitted to kicking Angela with the heel of his
foot near her hip area and possibly her shoulder and to stomping on her
thigh.

R749:87-88.

He also admitted biting Angela's arm and possibly

somewhere else. R749:88. And he admitted to grabbing her stomach and
"clenching or pinching and pulling" her there. R749:88.
Defendant admitted too that he "grabbed" Angela's lips "with his
hands and pulled them down and to the side," which "caused the tearing."
R749:89,96. Although Defendant clailned that he hit Angela only once with
a closed fist, he ad1nitted that he "repeatedly slapped her back and forth"
and "backhanded her," which he said hurt her nose. R749:89.
Defendant said that the assault lasted "probably a couple of hours,"
beginning the night before and ending "about eight or nine in the morning."
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R749:90-91. He said that Angela fought back '' a little bit, ... but not 1nuch

because she's a woman." R749:91.
Defendant said that Angela "lost consciousness" a couple of times
II

and that he h~ied to revive her on a couple occasions by breathing for her."
R749:86,91. Defendant said that he used Peroxide on Angela's face to help

stop the profuse bleeding and to clean her up. R749:91,95-96. He also said
11

that he took Angela, who weighed 216 pounds, to the bathtub" and "put
her head under the water." R748:174;R749:91,95-96.
Defendant said that Angela lost consciousness for the last time when
he strangled her around 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning. R749:92. Defendant
said that "he got her in a headlock at one point," but that "wasn't really
having much effect." R749:97. Then, "with Angela lying on her back, and
on the floor, he got on top of her and placed his elbow in her throat," but
that also "wasn't having much effect."

Id.

So Defendant "used his

forearm," "placed it across the front of her neck," and "leaned into her as
she was lying in her back." Id. Angela "was just screaming." R749:90.
Then, she blacked out and never regained consciousness. R749:97-98.
According to Defendant, he then lay down with Angela "and took a
nap." R749:92,98. When he awoke and could not arouse Angela, Defendant
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called Roger and then 911. R749:92,98.

Defendant said that he left the

house because Angela was not responding and he was scared. R749:92-93 .
. When asked why he had assaulted Angela, Defendant said he got
mad because "he thought" Angela "was cheating on him" with his brother
and "this enraged hhn," that Angela "admitted it and she kept saying it,"
and that when Defendant asked Angela to tell him she would stop, she
"wouldn't tell me that" and "that hurt my feelings." R749:166-68.

The autopsy.

The medical examiner, Dr. Todd Grey, autopsied

Angela's body the next day. R748:155. For many autopsies, Dr. Grey needs
only one sheet of paper with a body outline to record a person's injuries.
R748:172. For Angela, he needed five sheets. R748:172.

One of the first things Dr. Grey noticed was that "because she had
bled so much into her tissues" and "may have bled fairly extensive
externally as well," Angela had very little lividity- the pooling of blood
along gravity lines that normally occurs with death. R748:157-58.
Dr. Grey was most struck by the injuries to Angela's face, which were
consistent with someone beating her with his hands and feet. R748:168. Dr.
Grey found deep red bruising and swelling "essentially everywhere."
R748:163-64. He found scraping across her forehead, hemorrhaging in the

whites of her eyes, and a cut and fractured nose.
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R748:165.

He found

bruising on Angela's chin, the inner surfaces of her scalp, and her brain.
R748:167.

Finally, Dr. Grey found tears of the inner surfaces on both

Angela's upper and lower lips -

11

as if the lip had been pulled away from

the gum" -which "would've bled fairly significantly." R748:165-66.
Dr. Grey also found substantial injuries to Angela's neck consistent
with manual strangulation. R748:170-72. Specifically, he found diffused
bruising "all across the front and sides" of Angela's upper neck. R748:169.
He also found hemorrhaging in the main muscle that turns the neck and the
deeper muscles surrounding the Ada1n's apple. R748:169.
Next, Dr. Grey found "extensive" bruises-"too numerous to counton Angela's torso, abdomen, thighs, knees, shins, arms, hands, and
buttocks. R748:172-73,178-80. To the extent there was any pattern in the
bruises, Dr. Gray saw "lots of sort of distinct oval bruises grouped
together," possibly caused by knuckles or some type of pinching. R748:173.
A particularly large bruise across the left thigh was consistent with being
kicked or stomped on. R748:178.
Dr. Grey also noted diffuse bruising on Angela's left forearm and
hand that went" all the way around." R748:179. And he noted what looked
like bite marks on Angela's right back and right buttock. R748:179.
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Finally, Dr. Grey found eight fractured ribs, five on the right side and
three on the left. R748:176. All the fractures "had bleeding associated with
them." R748:176.
Dr. Grey testified that although Angela was on several prescribed
medications, her system had scant amounts of them. R748:183-84. Angela's
system had a more significant amount of methadone, but because she had
been prescribed methadone "fairly regularly" for years, Dr. Grey concluded
that the methadone did not contribute to her death. R748:185,187,196-97.
Dr. Grey concluded that Angela died from multiple intentionallyinflicted blunt force injuries and strangulation. He further concluded that
either the blunt force injuries or the strangulation could have been lethal on
their own. R748:157,189,192.
D.N.A. testing. Police sent several items for DNA testing-including

a pillow case, Defendant's pants, a swab from Angela's bathroom, and a
swab from Defendant's inner ear. R749:49-50. Blood from the pillow case
contained both Defendant's and Angela's DNA. R749:55-56. Angela was
the major contributor of the blood in Defendant's pants and the blood swab
taken from her bathtub. R749:60,63. Angela was also a contributor to the
blood found in Defendant's inner ear. R749:61.
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B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first degree

felony, and one count of obstructing justice, a second degree felony. Rl-3.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant unsuccessfully for a
directed verdict on the obstructing justice charge. R750:35-36,38. The jury
convicted Defendant as charged. R642.
The h·ial court sentenced Defendant to 15-years-to-life on the murder
conviction

and

one-year-to-fifteen-years

on

the

obstructing justice

conviction. R726-27. The court ordered that the sentences run concurrent to
each other but consecutive to sentences Defendant was already serving for
his prior aggravated kidnapping and assault of Angela. R726-27. 1
Defendant timely appealed. R728.

The Utah Supreme Court

transferred the appeal to this Court. R740-41.

C\

w

1

Before Defendant's trial in this case, Defendant was convicted of
aggravated kidnapping and assault with substantial bodily injury in
connection with his assault of Angela two weeks before he murdered her.
See State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, 344 P.3d 191. In that case, Defendant
got mad at Angela after she said that his friend could not stay over. Id. ,r2.
Defendant then hit Angela, bit her on the face, pulled her hair, and nearly
bit her ear off. Id. When Angela escaped her aparhnent, Defendant
dragged her 58 feet back to the apartment and closed her in it; a neighbor
then heard what he thought was Defendant slamming Angela's her head
into the wall. Id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant argues that the h·ial court cmrunitted reversible
error when it allowed Detective Reyes to testify to Defendant's admissions
about assaulting Angela, but prevented him from eliciting his explanation
for why he assaulted Angela. Although Defendant acknowledges that his
explanation for the assault was hearsay, he argues that it was admissible
under rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, to support his extreme emotional
distress mitigation defense and to explain his other admissions. Defendant
argues that the alleged error was prejudicial because it violated his right to
present his theory of the case to the jury.
Defendant's argument fails because whether or not the trial court's
ruling was erroneous, the court's ruling did not preclude Defendant from
presenting his defense. The ruling 1nerely required Defendant to present
his defense through other available means-i.e., his testimony.
Defendant's argument also fails because the trial court did not abuse
its discretion. First, rule 106 does not overcmne the proscription against
inad1nissible hearsay. Rule 106 allows the admission of additional portions
of a writing recorded statement when - "in fairness" - those portions are
necessary to explain or give context to otherwise misleading portions of the
writing already ad1nitted.

But nothing in rule 106 renders otherwise
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inadmissible hearsay admissible. Second, Defendant has not shown that
Detective Reyes' testimony about Defendant's admissions was misleading.
Thus, he cannot show why his self-serving after-the-fact hearsay
explanation was necessary .(fin fairness" to clarify Detective Reyes'
testimony.
But even if the trial court did err, Defendant cannot show prejudice.
Indeed, given the evidence in this case- including the length and brutality
of Defendant's attack on Angela and Defendant's conduct thereafter-any
error in excluding Defendant's unreliable hearsay was harmless.
Point II.

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction for obstructing justice. To convict Defendant of
obsh·ucting justice, the State had to prove that Defendant (1) altered,
destroyed, concealed, or removed any iten1 or other thing (2) with the intent
to hinder, delay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment (3) regarding conduct that constitutes a first
degree felony, in this case murder.
Here, the State presented evidence that Defendant brutally attacked
Angela over some seven hours; that she lost consciousness several tilnes
during the attack; that Defendant did not respond to attempts to contact
Angela during the attack; that Angela died at least two hours before
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Defendant called 911; that Defendant moved her or something around her
after she died; that Defendant not only cleaned blood off Angela but also
tried to clean blood off her bedroom walls and the bathroom floor, vanity,
and tub; that Defendant anonymously called 911; that Defendant fled; and
that it took police some six hours to lure him out of his friend's house once
they found him.
All this evidence supports a reasonable inference that Defendant not
only knew that he had killed Angela, but that either while she was dying or
after she had died, Defendant intentionally destroyed some of the blood
evidence to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S SELF-SERVING
HEARSAY EXPLANATION FOR WHY HE KILLED HIS
GIRLFRIEND WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 106,
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.

As relevant here, Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that
when a party introduces part of a writing or recorded statement, the
opposing party may seek introduction of another part "which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it."
Defendant argues that the trial court erred under rule 106 when, after
allowing Detective Reyes to present his admissions to brutally assaulting
-17-

Angela, it precluded him from eliciting on cross-examination the selfserving explanation he had given police for the assault-Le., that Angela
repeatedly told hhn she was having an affair with his brother and that,
despite his requests, she had refused to end the affair.

Aplt.Br. 14.

Defendant acknowledges that his explanation to police was hearsay. Id. 9.
He asserts that it was nonetheless admissible under rule 106 because it was
'"relevant"' to his exh·eme emotional distress mitigation defense and
'"necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context"' his admissions. Id. 14
(citation omitted). Defendant concludes that its exclusion was prejudicial
because it violated his due process right to present his theory of the case.
Defendant's constitutional contention fails at the outset because the
trial court's ruling did not deny him the opportunity to present an extreme
en1otional dish·ess mitigation defense. To the contrary, Defendant always
had the option to present his defense by taking the stand.
Defendant's argument, therefore, is limited to whether the h·ial court
erred under rule 106. It did not. First, nu1nerous courts have held that rule
106 does not allow the adn1ission of a defendant's self-serving and

otherwise inadmissible hearsay. Their reasoning is sound, and this Court
should adopt it.
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Second, even if rule 106 allowed the admission of self-serving hearsay
under certain limited circumstances, such hearsay is admissible only when
necessary "in fairness" to explain, clarify, or put in context statements
already admitted that would otherwise be misleadmg. Here, Defendant's
self-serving hearsay statements were not necessary to clarify misleading
testimony concerning his admissions to brutally attacking Angela.
Defendant sought admission of those statements only to minimize his
culpability for the brutal attack by providmg an after-the-fact explanationthat could not be challenged through cross-examination-for why he did it.
Under such circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that rule 106 did not require admitting Defendant's self-serving
statements.
Finally, Defendant cannot show prejudice. Given the evidence in this
case, any error in not ad1nitting Defendant's unreliable hearsay was
harmless.
A.

Proceedings below.

Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to
deny any request by Defendant to elicit his hearsay state1nents to Detective
Reyes about why he assaulted Angela. R298-303. Defendant moved under
rule 412, Utah Rules of Evidence, to ad1nit evidence of Angela's sexual
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history to support an anticipated exh·eme emotional distress mitigation
defense that Defendant assaulted Angela only after she repeatedly told him
that she was having an affair with his brother. R747:2-3;R.184-88,331-32,34548.
On the first day of trial before jury voir dire, the trial court struck the
State's motion in limine as untimely.

R747:3.

The court also denied

Defendant's rule 412 motion. Id. Defense counsel asked whether the court's
0

ruling meant that he could not elicit evidence that he believed that Angela
... had sexual relations with his brother." Id. The trial court clarified that
"[i]f [Defendant] testifies that he believed that she had had sex with his
brother, ... he can give that testimony." R747:4. But when defense counsel
suggested that he intended to elicit the evidence through other witnesses,
the court responded, "that depends" on whether the evidence would be
"admissible under the rules of evidence." R747:4. The State stated that if
Defendant tried to present that evidence through Detective Reyes, the State
would object to the evidence as "inappropriate hearsay." R747:8-9. The
parties then stipulated that the State would not use evidence of Defendant's
prior dmnestic violence against the victim in its case-in-chief unless the
defense opened the door to the evidence. R747:18-19. 2

2

See State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27,344 P.3d 191; see also fn.l supra.
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In opening statement, the State outlined the evidence it intended to
present to support the charges, including Defendant's extensive admissions
to Detective Reyes. R747:30-42. The defense responded that it intended to
show that Defendant assaulted Angela while experiencing extreme
emotional distress after learning that she "had had sexual relations with his
brother." R747:43.
On direct, Detective Reyes testified to Defendant's admissions
concerning his conduct during the assault.

R149:78-116.

On cross,

Defendant tried to elicit his after-the-fact explanation for the assault-that
Angela told him she was having an affair with his brother. R749:124. The
State objected that the explanation was inadmissible hearsay. R749:124-25. 3
In bench conference, the court ruled that it was Defendant's burden to
prove exh·eme emotional distress mitigation by a preponderance and that
the supporting evidence had to be admissible. R749:132. The court also
ruled that if counsel was seeking to introduce hearsay, "unless you can give
me an exception, it's not coming in."

R749:127.

The court tentatively

sustained the State's objection pending further discussion. R749:127-29.

3

Transcripts of Detective Reyes' testimony and discussion concerning
the State's objection are attached at Addendum B.
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At the next recess, the trial court let defense counsel examine
Detective Reyes to make a record of the evidence Defendant sought to have
admitted.

@

Reyes testified that Defendant said that he assaulted Angela

because he got mad. R749:150. Reyes testified that Defendant said he got
mad because "he thought" Angela "was cheating on him" with his brother
and "this enraged him." Defendant told Reyes that Angela "admitted it and
Ci
~

she kept saying it," and that when Defendant asked her to tell him she
would stop, Angela "wouldn't tell me that" and "that hurt my feelings."
c·,,

vu

R749:166-68.
Defendant then asserted five grounds on which these hearsay
statements were ad1nissible through Detective Reyes: (1) under the
confrontation clause; (2) under rule 106, the rule of completeness; (3) to
show bias; (4) they were not hearsay because they were not offered for the
truth of whether Angela was cheating on him, "but to explain his conduct";
and (5) to show Defendant's state of mind and motive. R749:164; R750:5.
After releasing the jury for the day, the court stated that it would research
and consider the issue overnight. R749:170-73.
The next morning, the trial court ruled that none of Defendant's
grounds supported introducing his hearsay state1nents through Detective
Reyes.

R750:5.

The court rejected Defendant's confrontation clause
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argument because "[t]o the extent he is seeking to elicit his own exculpatory
statements through the detective, on its face it is clear that his statements are
not the statements of a witness against him." R750:6.

The court rejected

Defendant's bias argument because the defense had pointed to nothing in
Detective Reyes' testimony that suggested bias or anything other "than a
straightforward response to [the parties'] questions." R750:9. The court
rejected Defendant's argu1nent that the statement was not being offered for
the truth of the matter asserted because if it were so, Defendant had failed
"to articulate its relevance." R750:10.

The court rejected Defendant's

"motive" argument because "the statement is an after-the-fact explanation
that seeks to minimize his culpability for his admitted conduct towards the
victim" and Defendant had not shown that it was made "under
circumstances that indicate its reliability and trustworthiness." R750:10-12.
Finally, in rejecting Defendant's rule 106 argument, the court noted
that under rule 106, it "1nust apply a fairness standard" and that it need
"admit only those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify, explain,
or place into context the portion that has already been inh·oduced." R750:7.
The court noted that here, "defendant seeks to ad1nit state1nents that are
essentially a self-serving, after-the-fact explanation for his conduct in
assaulting the victim, and that portion of the overall interview was
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temporally removed from the inculpatory statements that had been received
without objection." R750:8. The court then ruled "that the fairness analysis

©

does not require the admission of the state1nents offered to explain the
reasons for his brutal assault on the victim." R750:8.
The court concluded by observing that it was "not sure that the
defense has really thought through the potential implications had I ruled
the other way. Had those statements been introduced, it would certainly
open the door" for the State "to then put on all of the evidence of the
defendant's prior convictions for his assaultive behavior on the very same
victim just a few weeks prior, which would've totally undercut"
Defendant's exb·eme emotional disb·ess defense "that this was an out of
character, extreme, overwrought, emotional response to a triggering event."
R750:12-13.

In light of the trial court's ruling, defense counsel agreed that the
record lacked any basis for an extreme emotional distress jury instruction.
R750:13.

B.

The trial court's ruling did not deprive Defendant of his right
to present a complete defense.

Defendant's argurnent is pren-dsed on the assumption that tlle trial
court's ruling denied him his due process right to present his theory of the
case.

See Aplt.Br. 14,17 (asserting that his hearsay statements were
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@

"relevant" to his extreme emotional distress mitigation defense). Defendant
then argues that because the ruling was erroneous and violated his
constitutional right to present a defense, the State must show that the
court's ruling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 17.
Defendant's claim fails at the outset because the trial court's exclusion
of his hearsay did not deny him the opportunity to present an extreme
emotional distress mitigation defense. To the contrary, Defendant always
had the choice to present that mitigation defense by taking the stand and
testifying.
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recognized this in State v. Cruz-Meza,
2003 UT 32, 76 P.3d 1165.

After murdering his girlfriend, Cruz-Meza

admitted to a friend that he had committed the murder, but claimed that he
did so only because she refused to let him visit his son and then pointed a
gun at him.

Id. at ,I,I2,4.

The trial court ruled that Cruz-Meza's oral

explanation to his friend was unh·ustworthy and umeliable and thus
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inadmissible to support an extreme emotional distress mitigation defense.

Id. at if 6. 4
Like Defendant here, Cruz-Meza argued that "by excluding the
statements in question, the h·ial court deprived [him] of the opportunity to
present evidence supporting a defense of extreme emotional distress
without taking the witness stand and waiving his privilege against selfincrimination." Id. at ljf16. That choice, Cruz-Meza argued, violated his
right to due process. Id.
G

The supreme court held that Cruz-Meza's argument was "without
merit." Id. at if 16. The court noted that "' the completeness doctrine is not
cmnpelled by the Constitution."' Id. at ljf17 (quoting 21 Charles Alan Wright
& Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure,§ 5077 (1977)). The

court also noted that '"[n]either the Constitution nor Rule 106 ... requires
the admission of the entire staten1ent once any portion is admitted in a
4

Cruz-Meza brought his clailn under the common law rule of
cmnpleteness, which required adn1ission of a con1plete statement whenever
part of it was inh·oduced. See Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ljf9. That rule has
been supplanted by rule 106 as far as writings or recorded state1nents go.
ld. Cruz-Meza's statements, however, were oral; thus, Cruz-Meza argued
that they should have been adn1itted under the cmnmon law rule. Id. at if 7.
The Utah Suprern.e Court agreed with Cruz-Meza "that the rule of
completeness 1nay be applied to oral statements through rule 611, Utah
Rules of Evidence, which requires trial courts to "1nake the presentation of
evidence 'effective for the ascertainment of the h·uth."' Id. at ,110 (quoting
Utah R. Evid. 611(a)).
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criminal prosecution."' Id. (quoting United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 729
(5th Cir. 1006)). The court then noted "that the fairness and trustworthiness
tests are more than adequate to address any constitutional concerns with
selective admission of oral statements by criminal defendants." Id.
court concluded:
<'.:.,

The

"Despite the difficulty in making a decision about

whether to testify in his own defense, the fact remains that Cruz-Meza was

"I.IV

entirely free to choose-the trial court's ruling excluding evidence did not
compel him to testify." Id.
Thus, under Cruz-Meza, excluding a defendant's exculpatory hearsay
statements does not deprive a defendant of his right to present a defense.
Rather, at 1nost, it requires a defendant to make the difficult decision about
whether to testify in support of it. Compare State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App
215,

1if59, 335 P.3d

900 (holding that erroneous exclusion of out-of-court

statements made by people other than defendant-and thus to which
defendant could not testify--deprived defendant of meaningful opportunity
to present defense).
Defendant's contention that the h·ial court's ruling violated his due
process right to present a defense, therefore, fails. Consequently, Defendant
can prevail on appeal only if he can show both that the h·ial court abused its
discretion by excluding his hearsay state1nents and that he was prejudiced
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by that error, i.e., that there is a "reasonable likelihood that it affected the
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45,

,r,r33, 40, 784 Utah

Adv. Rep. 38 (holding that failure to give lesser offense instruction is "'not
harmful unless there is a reasonable likelihood" of a different result absent
the error) (citation omitted).

C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
Defendant's self-serving hearsay under rule 106.
Defendant challenge only the trial court's ruling under rule 106 fails.
The common law doctrine or rule of completeness "generally
provides that a party may introduce the whole of a statement if any part is
introduced by the opposing party." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,I9, 76
P.3d 1165. Until the adoption of uniform evidentiary rules, Utah recognized
this common law doctrine. See State v. Dunkley, 39 P.2d 1097, 1109 (Utah
1935); State v. Martin, 300 P. 1034, 1038 (Utah 1931); see also Aplt.Br. 10,15
(citing both cases).
Today, rule 106 governs the admission of part or all of a written
statement when one party admits another part of it:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
inh·oduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that ti111e of any other part or any other writing
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or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it. 5
By its plain language, therefore, Rule 106 "codifies" the common law rule of
completeness only "in part." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19,140,345 P.3d 1195.
Unlike

the common law

rule - and conh·ary

to

Defendant's

contention, see Aplt.Br. 15-rule 106 does not require the wholesale
admission of every written or recorded statement merely because an
opposing party relied on some part of it. Rather, its "function" is only "to
prevent a 'misleading impression created by taking matters out of context."'

Jones, 2015 UT 19, ,r40 (quoting State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 144 n.6, 993
P.2d 232); accord United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 669, 728 (5th Cir. 1006);

United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1360 (D.C. 1986); United States v. Jamar,
561 F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1977). 6

Rule 106 thus requires only the
II

admission of those additional portions of a writing relevant and necessary
II

to qualify, explain, or place into context" an otherwise misleading portion
already inh·oduced." Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if43 (quoting Branch, 91 F.3d

5

This Court has held that rule 106 also applies "to h·anscribed oral
state1nents that are used extensivelv at trial." State v. Leleae, 1999 UT Aoo
368, 'if 44 n.7, 993 P.2d 232.
J

•

6

J.

.L

Federal cases interpreting analogous evidentiary rules are persuasive
guidance to Utah courts in interpreting state evidence rules. See Leleae, 1999
UT App 368, 'if43 n.5.
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at 728) (additional quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Jones, 2015
UT 19, if40; State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,I14, 76 P.3d 1165.
A trial court has

II

considerable discretion" under rule 106

11

in

determining issues of fairness." Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if45; accord Jones,
2015 UT 19, ,I42.
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion because rule
106 does not render inadmissible hearsay admissible.

Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court "has [yet] had the
occasion to decide" whether evidence proffered under rule 106 must be
otherwise admissible. See State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if41 & n.56, 345 P.3d
195. For the reasons stated below, this Court should hold that evidence
must be otherwise admissible and affirm the trial court.
"Generally, out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter
asserted-hearsay- are not admissible." State v. Nguyen, 2011 UT A pp 2,

,r10, 246 P.3d 535; see also Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (hearsay is any out-of-court
II

statement that a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement"); Utah R. Evid. 802 (hearsay "is not admissible
except as provided by law or by these rules").
A declarant' s out-of-court inculpatory staterrLents are an exception.

See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (opposing party's statements not hearsay when
offered against that party); Utah R. Evid. 804(3) (exception to hearsay rule

-30-

for statements against a declarant's interests). This exception "is founded
on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people
who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements
unless they believe them to be true." Williamson v. United States. 512 U.S.
594, 599 (1994). Such statements, therefore, are deemed reliable enough to
allow their admission without the safeguards applicable to "in court
statements- the oath, the witness' awareness of the gravity of the
proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness' demeanor, and, most
importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine." Id. at 598.
In conh·ast, a self-exculpatory out-of-court statement is "inherently
unreliable," State v. Fernandez, 604 A.3d 1308, 1313 (Conn. App. 1992),
because it has "nothing to guarantee its testimonial trustworthiness." State
v. Brooks. 909 S.W.2d 854, 863 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. 1995) (citation omited). The

"fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not
make more credible the non-self-inculpatory parts." Williamson. 512 U.S. at
599-600. This is because such statements" are not unambiguously adverse to
the penal interest of the declarant,' but instead are likely to be attempts to
minhnize the declarant's culpability."' Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 132
(1999) (explaining why defendant's statements inculpating co-defendant are
generally inadmissible against co-defendant) (emphasis in original). Such
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statements, therefore, "are exactly the ones which people are 1nost likely to
1nake even when they are false." Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599-600.
Consequently, the hearsay rule requires that when "a party offers his
own out-of-court declaration for its truth," that declaration "must satisfy the
hearsay rule." Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law
742 (1996).

Several courts have held that rule 106 does not alter that

requirement. See, e.g., United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League,
842 F.2d 1335, 1375-76 (2d Cir. 1988) (rule 106 "does not compel admission
of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence"); United States v. Hassan, 742
F.3d 104, 134 (4th Cir. 2014) (rule 106 '" does not render admissible ...
evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules'")
(citation omitted); United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir.1996)
(rule 106 "does not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay
evidence.").
Otherwise, as these courts have explained, a criminal defendant
"would be' able to place his exculpatory statements' before the jury without
subjecting [himself] to cross-examination, precisely what the hearsay rule
forbids."' United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation
mnitted). A defendant would then "never want to testify" because he could
"make evidence in his favor at his pleasure." Fernandez, 604 A.3d at 1313.
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"The door would be thrown open to obvious abuse: an accused could create
evidence for himself by making statements in his favor for subsequent use
at his trial to show his innocence."

Brooks. 909 S.W.2d at 863 (citation

omitted).
This Court should follow the lead of these courts and commentators
and hold that before hearsay is admissible under rule 106, its proponent
must show that it fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. Because
Defendant concedes that his statements were hearsay, this Court should
also affirm the trial court's ruling.
2. Alternatively, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because rule 106' s "fairness" standard did not require
admission of Defendant's hearsay statements.

Even if rule 106 allowed otherwise inadmissible hearsay in limited
r:,

"9

circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
hearsay statements here, because they did not meet the rule's "fairness"
require1nen t.
As stated, the purpose of rule 106 is only "to prevent a 'misleading
impression created by taking matters out of context.'" State v. Jones, 2015
UT 19, ,I40, 345 P.3d 1195 (quoting State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if 44 n.6,
993 P.2d 232). Rule 106 applies only when, "in fairness," other portions of a
writing are "necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context" an
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otherwise misleading "portion already introduced." Leleae, 1999 UT App
368, if43 (citations omitted); accord Jones, 2015 UT 19, if 40; State v. Cruz-Meza,
2003 UT 32, ~14, 76 P.3d 1165.
"Fairness does not require that the h·ial court allow admission of
otherwise inadmissible hearsay." Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 948 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008) (upholding exclusion of inadmissible hearsay under rule 106
where defendant did not testify and thus "admission of the excluded
conversations would be unfair since the State could not question
[defendant] as to their contents"); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 134
(4th Cir. 2014) (rule 106 does not require the blind "ad1nission of selfserving, exculpatory state1nents 1nade by a party which are being sought for
admission by that same party").
Thus, rule 106 is not a means by which a defendant can simply
"thwart hearsay rules and ad1nit his entire statement without being subject
to cross-examination."

McAtee v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608, 630-31

(Ky. 2013) (rule 106' s fairness standard "does not 1nean that by inh·oducing
a portion of a defendant's confession in which the defendant admits the
cmnmission of the criminal offense, the [prosecution] opens the door for the
defendant to use the remainder of that out-of-court statement for the
(,:·;

purpose of asserting a defense without subjecting it to cross-examination");
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\Jill

accord State v. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642, 650-51 (Wis. 1998); cf People v. Davis,
218 P.3d 718, 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) ("[s]elf-serving hearsay declarations
made by a defendant may [still] be excluded" under the rule of
cmnpleteness

"because

there

is

nothing

to

guarantee

their

trustworthiness").
Rather, in" determining fairness," one issue is certainly "'whether the
meaning of the included portion is altered by the excluded portion."' Sykes

v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Ky. 2015).

But courts may also

consider whether admitting the unreliable hearsay statement "will insure a
fair and hnpartial understanding of all of the evidence." United States v.

Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992).

Courts may also consider

whether the probative value of the unreliable hearsay "is substantially
outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, or waste of time, Rule 403."

Graham, Handbook on

Federal Evidence, at §106.1 (4th ed. 1996). Cf State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32,
iri,9-15, 76 P.3d 1165 (affirn1ing exclusion of defendant's self-serving
explanation to friend for why he killed girlfriend, where the statement
lacked "any circumstantial guarantees of h·ustworthiness or indicia of
reliability").
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Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion
under rule 106.

Most importantly, except for one statement in which

Defendant said he attacked Angela because he was mad, all of Defendant's
statements elicited through Detective Reyes on direct examination were
admissions regarding how Defendant assaulted Angela. R749:81-98. Thus,
Detective Reyes' testimony went almost exclusively to Defendant's conduct,
not to why Defendant engaged in the conduct.
Defendant makes no claim that Detective Reyes' testimony distorted
or was otherwise misleading as to Defendant's conduct. See Aplt.Br. 8-20.

See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 435 (9th Cir. 1985) (removing
defendant's explanation of "motivations for his actions did not change the
meaning of the portions of his confession sub1nitted to the jury" or "alter
the fact that he admitted committing the acts with which he was charged").
Defendant thus has not shown that his self-serving statements
regarding why he engaged in the conduct were necessary in fairness "to
qualify, explain., or place into context" Detective Reyes' testimony
concerning what Defendant's conduct was. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,

if 43

(citation omitted); see also United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 669, 728 (5th Cir.
1006) (neither rule 106 nor the rule of completeness required adn1itting
defendant's exculpatory state1nents explaining why he picked up and fired
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weapon). Compare United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993)
(in gun possession case, Haddad's denial that he knew a gun was under his
bed was admissible to place in context his admission that he knew drugs
were under the bed; without the denial, the drug admission unfairly
implied that Haddad also admitted knowing the gun was there).
Admittedly, Detective Reyes' testimony that Defendant said he
attacked Angela because he was mad addressed more than just Defendant's
conduct. But Defendant's brief provides no insight as to how that statement
was misleading. See Aplt. Br. 8-20. Nor can he, where the statement implies
nothing about whether Defendant's anger was legally excusable or not.
Thus, again, Defendant has not shown that his self-serving statements were
necessary "to qualify, explain, or place into context" Detective Reyes'
testimony. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ,43 (citation omitted).
Finally, under rule 106' s "fairness" standard, the trial court could
properly consider whether it was fair to the State and the victim to admit
Defendant's after-the-fact explanation that 1ninimized his culpability by
shifting part of the blame to his murder victim. See Williamson v. United

States. 512 U.S. 594, 601 (1994) (exculpatory statements umeliable and "this
II

is especially true" when the statement implicates someone else"). Indeed,
II

just as a codefendant' s statements about what the defendant said or did are
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less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence," Williamson, 512 U.S. at 601, so
too are a defendant's statements that cast aspersions on a victim who can no
longer defend herself.
The h·ial court could also properly consider whether it was fair to the
State and the victim to allow Defendant in a jury trial to rely on his
inherently unreliable hearsay statements to assert a defense that he had the
burden of proving and that the State could not cross-examine him on. See

Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 361 (Dela. 1998) (upholding denial of rule
106 motion in light of rule 403, where defendant's decision to not testify
denied State ability to test his credibility through cross-examination);

McAtee, 413 S.W.3d at 630-31 (rule 106's fairness standard "does not mean
that by introducing a portion of a defendant's confession in which the
defendant admits the commission of the criminal offense, the [prosecution]
opens the door for the defendant to use the remainder of that out-of-court
statement for the purpose of asserting a defense without subjecting it to
cross-examination"); cf State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, °if16-17, 76 P.3d 1165
(rejecting defendant's claim that trial court's exclusion of his explanation for
1nurder deprived him "of the opportunity to present evidence supporting a
defense of extreme emotional distress without taking the witness stand").
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All these considerations support the trial court's ruling precluding
Defendant frmn eliciting his self-serving hearsay through Detective Reyes.
None of Defendant's cases undermine the trial court's ruling.

See

Aplt.Br. 12-14 (citing Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376 (D.C. 2006); State v.

Cabrera-Pena. 605 S.E.2d 522 (S.C. 2004); Long v. State, 610 So.2d 1276 (Fla.
1992) (per curiam)). Defendant first cites Cox.

Cox was arrested in the

District of Columbia for having a gun without a license after his car was
stopped on an unrelated matter. Cox. 898 A.2d at 378. When Cox saw the
police looking inside his car, he told them that he did not have a license for
the gun in the District but that his gun was registered in Maryland and that
he had simply forgotten to take the gun out of the car after using it for
target shooting the day before. Id. at 379. At trial, the police officer testified
only to Cox's statement that he did not have a license. Cox sought to elicit
the rest of his statement under rule 106 to clarify the mis-impression left by
the officer's testimony that Defendant gave no innocent explanation for
having the gun. Id. at 379-80. The trial court denied Cox's request on the
ground that his statements were inadmissible hearsay and not necessary
under rule 106. Id. The appellate court held that the trial court erred. The
court first concluded that Cox's statements were not hearsay because they
were not offered for their h·uth but merely to show that they were made. Id.
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380-81. The court then held the evidence was necessary under rule 106 to
clarify the misimpression left by the officer's testimony, but that any error
was harmless. Id. at 381-83.
Unlike Cox, Defendant acknowledges that his self-serving statements
were offered to support his extreme emotional distress defense and were
thus hearsay.

Aplt.Br. 9-10.

Also unlike Cox, Defendant has made no

showing that his hearsay state1nents were necessary to clarify any testimony
under rule 106. Id. 8-20. Cox, therefore, is distinguishable.

Cabrera-Pena is likewise distinguishable, but for different reasons.
First, unlike here, Cabrera-Pena involved an unrecorded oral state1nent.

State v. Cabrera-Pena. 605 S.E.2d 522, 524-26 (S.C. 2004). Second, unlike Utah,
which limits the reach of rule 106 to only those portions of a statement
necessary to clarify portions already admitted, South Carolina appears to
superimpose the common law rule of co1npleteness onto its rule 106
analysis.

See id. (holding under case law that when one part of

conversation admitted, adverse party entitled to prove remainder, so long
as relevant).
Finally, Long involved the State's use of a brief excerpt of a television
interview with Long, Long had been denied access to the complete
interview. Long v. State, 610 So.2d 1276, 1279-80 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
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The appellate court held that Long's inability to access the complete
interview precluded him from determining whether he was

II

entitled to

bring out the remainder" of the video under rule 106. Id. 1280. Thus, Long
did not involve a defendant's attempt to admit evidence under rule 106;
rather, it involved a defendant's ability to discover evidence that,
depending on what it revealed, might have been admissible under rule 106.

Id.
In sum, Defendant has not shown that the trial abused its discretion
when it precluded him from eliciting his self-serving hearsay statements.

3. Finally, even if the trial court erred, Defendant's claim
fails for lack of prejudice.
Finally, even if the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
Defendant's proffered statements, Defendant cannot show prejudice.
Defendant claims he was prejudiced because the trial court's ruling
11

completely precluded [him] frmn presenting his theory of the case,"

thereby depriving him

II

of his due process right to present a complete

defense." Aplt.Br. 17. Defendant argues that if the court had permitted his
self-serving hearsay statements, he "would have been entitled to a jury

Defendant speculates that" the jury n1ay well have found special mitigation
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by a preponderance of the evidence" because "the evidence was consistent
with [his] theory" that he acted under extreme emotional distress. Id. 20.
Based on his assertion that the trial court's alleged error violated his
due process rights, Defendant argues the error was harmful unless the State
proves that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Aptl.Br. 17; see also

State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, if 45, 55 P.3d 573 (when error involves a
constitutional violation, State must prove error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt). As demonstrated, however, the trial court's error-if
any- did not deprive Defendant of his right to present a defense. See Point
l.C. supra; State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 1~16-17, 76 P.3d 1165 (rejecting
defendant's contention that exclusion of his hearsay statements deprived
him of right to present an extreme emotional distress defense, where "CruzMeza was entirely free to choose" to present evidence supporting his
defense by testifying).
The trial court's error, if any, therefore, was not a constitutional one.
Consequently, prejudice exists only if Defendant can show a reasonable
likelihood of a different result absent the error. See State v. Williams, 2014 UT
App 198, ,I20, 333 P.3d 1287. Defendant has not made and cannot make that
showing here.
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First, contrary to Defendant's suggestion, see Aplt.Br. 19, a defendant
is not entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense merely because
some evidence-however unreliable- supports that theory. See, e.g. Clark v.

State, 928 So.2d 193, 196 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) ("Each party has the right to
have his theory of the case presented to the jury by instructions, provided
that there is credible evidence that supports that theory.") (emphasis added);

accord People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 163 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Samson

v. State., 69 P.3d 1154, 1160 (Mont. 2003); Foster v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d
198, 200 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). Rather, he is entitled to an instruction only
when the evidence provides a "reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that"
the theory applies. State v. Martinez, 2013 UT App 154, if 3, 304 P.3d 110
(discussing defendant's right to a self-defense instruction) (citation omitted;
alterations in original) (emphasis added).
Thus, even in cases where the defendant carries no burden of proof at
all, if "the evidence is so slight as to be incapable of raising a reasonable
doubt in the jury's mind" as to whether a defense applies, "tendered
instructions thereon are properly refused." State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386,
1389-90 (Utah 1977) (citation 01nitted); accord State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, i125,
61 P.3d 1019; see also State v. Orej, 2010 UT 35, if 15, 233 P.3d 476 (State must
disprove existence of affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt once
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defendant produces some evidence to support it). Here, Defendant had the
burden of proving his special mitigation defense. See Drej, 2010 UT 25, ,121
(recognizing that special mitigation statute places burden of proof on
defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence); Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-5-205.5 (West Supp. 2009) (defining

extreme emotional distress as special mitigation).

The evidentiary basis

supporting the defense, therefore, must be at least that high.
But no matter what the level of reasonable basis is required,
Defendant would not have met it even had the trial court admitted his
hearsay statements.

That is because Defendant's clahn to an extreme

emotional dish·ess mitigation defense turns on his own self-serving and
thus inherently unreliable hearsay statements.

See R750:13 (defense

acknowledging that no evidence supports extreme e1notional distress
instruction without Defendant's self-serving hearsay statement); see also

State v. Fernandez, 604 A.2d 1308, 1313 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993) (selfexculpatory out-of-court statements are "inherently umeliable").

And

Defendant's unreliable hearsay staten1ents here do not constitute a
"reasonable basis" for the jury to conclude that his exh·eme emotional
dish·ess mitigation defense applies, let alone a reasonable basis to conclude

-44-

that he has proven that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Martinez, 2013 UT App 154, ,I3.
Finally, even if Defendant's hearsay statements could have justified
an extreme emotional distress defense in this case, any error in excluding
them was harmless because "no reasonable likelihood exists that the error
affected the outcome" of Defendant's case. State v. Ferguson, 2011 UT App
77, ,I19, 250 P.3d 89 (emphasis added).
The evidence in this case shows that Defendant brutally attacked
Angela for some six hours; that in the process, he tore Angela's lips out,
strangled her several tin1es, stomped on her, and broke eight ribs; that he
delayed calling for help for over hvo hours after Angela died and then did
so only anonymously; that he manipulated Angela's body after she died;
that he spent time trying to clean up the mess he had made not only trying
to clean up Angela, but by trying to wipe blood off her bedroom walls and
her bathroom floor, vanity, and tub; and that he then fled to a friend's house
and refused to come out for six hours after police had arrived.

See

Sumn1ary of Facts, supra.
Given this evidence, no reasonable jury would have believed that
Defendant tortured Angela for six hours and then killed her only in a bout
of "extreme emotional distress for which there [was] a reasonable
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explanation or excuse." Utah Code Aim. § 76-5-205.S(l)(b). Indeed, there
was nothing reasonable about Defendant's prolonged and brutal attack.
That the jury would reject Defendant's defense is even more certain
where, as the h·ial court stated, the admission of Defendant's statements
would have opened the door to evidence of Defendant's prior shnilar
attacks on Angela, including an attack just two weeks before he killed her.
R750:12-13.

See, e.g.,State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, 344 P.3d 191

(affirming Defendant's convictions for aggravated kidnapping and assault
with substantial bodily injury after Defendant got mad at Angela because
she would not let a friend stay over and hit her, pulled her hair, and almost
bit her ear off). As the trial court noted, that evidence "would've totally
undercut" any contention that Defendant's deadly attack on Angela "was
an out of character, extreme, overwrought, emotional response to a
triggering event." Id.
In short, even if the trial court's ruling was erroneous, the error was
not only harmless. See State v. Williams, 2014 UT App 198, ,I20, 333 P.3d
1287 (evidentiary errors are harmless if there is no reasonable likelihood
that error affected the result).
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II
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT TRIED TO CLEAN UP
THE BLOOD IN THE MURDER VICTIM'S APARTMENT
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS OBSTRUCTING
JUSTICE CONVICTION

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
obstructing justice conviction.

Aplt.Br. 20-32.

Specifically, Defendant

contends that the evidence was insufficient to support that he intended to
kill Angela or that he cleaned up the aparhnent after she died with the
intent to conceal evidence.

Id. 20.

Defendant also asserts that any

contention that he intended to hinder a 1nurder investigation, "was belied
by the fact that bloodstains pervaded the crime scene" and he ''himself
called the police and left the door open for them."

Id. 28.

In short,

Defendant argues, "there was no evidence" that he "ever concealed or
destroyed evidence specifically intending to hinder the investigation of
Angela's murder." Id. 31.
In a sufficiency challenge, this Court views "the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I18, 10 P.3d 346. This Court reverses
only if, "in that light, 'the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
i1nprobable such that reasonable 1ninds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant c01n1nitted the crime for which he or she was
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convicted."'

State v. Ricks, 2013 UT App 238,

,rs,

314 P.3d 1033 (quoting

Holgate, 2000 UT 74, if18). "So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can reasonably be made," this Court's "inquiry stops." State v.
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, if 16, 25 P.3d 985.
Here, the jury was instructed that to convict Defendant of obsh·ucting
justice, it had to find that he:
2.

altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any item or other
thing.

3.

That [he] acted with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the
investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or
punishment regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal
offense; AND

4.

That [his] conduct constituted the criminal offense of 1nurder.

R668 (Instr. 23). See also Utah Code Ann. § .76-8-306(1)(c), (3)(a) (West Supp.
2014) (defining second degree felony obsh·uction of justice).
At trial, the State presented the following evidence supporting
Defendant's guilt of that crime:
Defendant assaulted Angela for some six hours, R748:4851,57-64;R749:90-91;
Defendant punched, slapped, kicked, stomped on, and
strangled Angela, R749:81-98;
Angela lost consciousness several times, R749:86,91;
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due to the injuries Defendant inflicted on her face,
Angela likely bled substantially, but she had relatively
little blood on her face when police found her, R748:15758,165-66; St.Exh. 7A;
both neighbors and police called and checked on
Angela's apartment before 7:00 a.m., but no one
answered, R748:57-64; 71-75;
Angela died at least two hours before Defendant called
for help at 10:00 a.m., 748:143,159-60; R:749:16-17;
either Angela or items around her had been moved after
rigor mortis had set in, R749:16-17;
police found a wet, bloody wad of gauze near Angela's
legs, as well as an empty bottle of peroxide and a spray
bottle of antiseptic, R749:18-20,28;
police found dripping-wet, bloody towels in a hamper,
R749:17-18,21;
police found smears of diluted blood on Angela's
bedroom walls and a light switch, R749:17-18,21,23;
police found that blood had been sufficiently wiped off
Angela's bathroom floor, vanity, and tub to no longer be
visible to the naked eye, R749:34-35,37-38;
although Angela had been dead for at least two hours by
the tilne Defendant called 911, he did not report a death,
but only that a woman was not breathing, R748:12627, 130,134;
Defendant called 911 anony1nously and then fled,
R748:76, 94, 126-27, 130-134;R749:13.
The evidence of the brutal attack, the lack of response when
neighbors and police checked in on the apartment, the fact that Angela had
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died several hours before Defendant called 911, and the fact that either
Angela or items around her were moved after rigor mortis had set in all
support a reasonable inference that at some point-either before Angela
actually died or after-Defendant realized he had killed her.
The evidence of the bloody injuries to Angela's face, the relative lack
·of blood on her face when police found her, the bloody wad of gauze near
her, the soaking wet, bloody towels found in the hamper, the diluted blood
on the bedroom walls, and the latent blood on the bathroom floor, vanity,
and tub all support a reasonable inference that sometime after that
realization, Defendant tried to clean up- i.e., "alter[], destroy[], conceal[], or
remove[]" -evidence showing not only that he killed Angela during a
brutal attack but how brutal the attack actually was. Utah Code Ann. § 768-306(1)(c).
Finally, evidence that Defendant did not respond when neighbors
and police checked in on the apartment, that he waited two hours before
calling 911, that he called 911 anonymously, and that when he called 911, he
did not report a death but only a person not breathing all support a
reasonable inference that Defendant's intent was "to hinder, delay or
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or
punishment" regarding Angela's murder. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-306(1)(c).
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Defendant's contends, however, that there was no evidence to
support that he ever intended to murder Angela. Aplt.Br. 20. Defendant's
contention is not credible on its face.

But even if it were, Defendant's

murder charge in this case did not require proof that Defendant intended to
kill Angela.

R662; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (homicide

constitutes murder if the actor causes the death "intentionally or
knowingly" or if "intending to cause serious bodily injury to another," he
"commits an act clearly dangerous to human life" or if "acting under
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life," he
"knowingly engages in conduct which creates a crave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another"). Nor did obstructing
justice charge. Rather, it required proof only that at s01ne point Defendant
realized he had. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-306(1)(c).
Contrary to Defendant's contention, therefore, the State presented
1nore than sufficient" evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made."
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, if 16.

In asserting otherwise, heavily on his description of his conduct to
police - such as that he used the gauze on Angela to try to revive her; that
after she lost consciousness that last time, he fell asleep for two hours; and
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that he was distraught when Detective Reyes told him Angela was dead.
Aplt.Br.26-29. But the jury was under no obligation to believe Defendant's
statements.

Cf Sate v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, if 41, 784 Utah Adv. Rep. 38

("Essentially, Mr. Reece asked the jury to believe that sometime during a
crime scene that spanned two hours and in which he committed multiple
felonies, he felt compelled to stop at the victim's him just to be a good
citizen. We find his story to be simply incredible.").
Alternatively, Defendant argues that the State presented no evidence
"that he concealed evidence specifically intending to
investigation" of Angela's murder.

Aplt.Br. 29.

hinder

the

But as this Court has

repeatedly held, "[k]nowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be
inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying
circumstances."

State v. Bingham, 2015 UT App 103, if29, _

P.3d _

(quoting State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ,r10, 988 P.2d 949). And as
stated, the jury had more than enough evidence in this case-including
Defendant's cleaning up blood from bedromn walls and bathroom floors
and moving Angela's body after she died - from which to infer the
necessary intent.
Finally, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient because
"bloodstains pervaded the crime scene" and he "himself called the police."
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Aplt.Br. 28. But Defendant called the police anonymously, and concealing
the murderer's identity would certainly hinder the murder investigation;
indeed, it let Defendant flee from the scene. R748:126-27,130,134. Also, the
obstructing justice statute requires only proof that the person concealed or
altered one item or thing. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1)(c) (requiring
proof that the defendant "altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any

item or other thing") (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that Defendant was
not particularly good at concealing evidence-Le., that he was not
successful in concealing every piece of it-does not defeat his obstructing
justice conviction.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's
convictions.
Respectfully submitted on June 3, 2015.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK \

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2009)
Gi>

( 1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:

(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18
years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(I) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 7 6-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-30 I;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302;

(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding discharge of a
firearm or dangerous weapon.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
and thereby causes the death of another;
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a
party to the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the
course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the
commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and

(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate
offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer or military service member
in unifonn while in the commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4;

(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section
76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; or
(iii) an assault against a military service member in uniform under Section 7 6-5102.4;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is
reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4 ); or

(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established
under Section 76-5-205.5.

(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life.
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another under a
reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing
circumstances.
(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
( c) This affinnative defense reduces charges only from:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate
offense does not merge with the crime of murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described in
Subsection (I) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and
punished for, the separate offense.

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-205.5 (West Supp. 2009)
(I) Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death of another or attempts to
cause the death of another:
(a)(i) under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts under a
delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305;
(ii) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant
believed them to be in the delusional state, those facts would provide a legal
justification for the defendant's conduct; and
(iii) the defendant's actions, in light of the delusion, were reasonable from the
objective viewpoint of a reasonable person; or
(b) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.

~

(2) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged
offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under Subsection (l)(a) on the basis of
mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed to
the mental illness.
(3) Under Subsection ( 1)(b ), emotional distress does not include:
(a) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or
(b) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.

i.@1

( 4) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection ( 1)(b) shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances.
(5)(a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection (5)(b) are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation under
this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a verdict on
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5)(6).
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is:
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of murder;

(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of
attempted murder;
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; or
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted
manslaughter.
(6)(a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to establish the
existence of the special mitigation.
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a
verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5).
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been
established, it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the
prosecution has established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
( d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special mitigation has
been established, the result is a hung jury.
(7)(a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the trier of fact, it shall return a
special verdict indicating whether the existence of special mitigation has been found.
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at the same time as the general
verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict.
(8) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any case, reduce the level of an
offense by more than one degree from that offense, the elements of which the evidence
has established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West Supp. 2009)
•

(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense:

(a) provides any person with a weapon;
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from perfonning any act
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment
of any person;
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing;
(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false;

(e) harbors or conceals a person;
(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding
discovery or apprehension;

•
•

(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension;
(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire communications
or of a pending application for an order authorizing the interception of wire
communications;
(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a
judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or

G) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting
an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation.

(2 )(a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means
conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of this
section, and includes:
(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political
subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or teITitory of the United
States; and
(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an
adult.

(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States, is a:
(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment
without parole;
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with
parole or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years;
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years;
(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any
period exceeding one year; and
(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period
of one year or less.
(3) Obstruction of justice is:
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a
capital felony or first degree felony;
(b) a third degree felony if:
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree
felony and the actor violates Subsection ( I )(b ), ( c), ( d), ( e ), or ( f);
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a
capital or first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (1 )(a);
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or
(iv) a violation of Subsection (1 )(h); or
( c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated
under Subsection (3)(a) or (b).
(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct
constituting an offense.
(5) Subsection (I)( e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed
by Section 62A-7-402.

(6) Subsection ( 1)(b) does not apply to:
(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5;
(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-316;
(c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is governed
by Section 76-8-508;
(d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed by Section
76-8-508.3; or
( e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed
by Section 76-8-509.
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony if
the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has escaped from official custody as
defined in Section 76-8-309.

Utah R. Evid. 106
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may
require the introduction, at that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

Addendum B

Addendum B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT..i SALT LAKE

Fll~B DIIT!UCT CHIT
Third J ~- · I ·5t ·
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
uciic,a Di nct
SEP 1 0 2014
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Appellate Court Case No. 20140749
Volume III of IV

V

JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ,
Defendant.

: With Keyword Index

JURY TRIAL MAY 19, 20, 21, & 22, 2014
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way

-·---Snndy;-tJtatr84t>92
801-523-1186

r

t.~\ ~-~.,,. " --~ r

!".'

r.

\.
,....

~

-

••

•__ ,

,.

C•

•

•·

t:

·.:

B_ ff

It•~.

ff

·... h
~-1._..,...:,;i\l Wll

FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS'

DEC O2 2014

io1 Yo11'l~i

- - - ~---

1

in the middle of his testimony.

2

THE COURT: All right.

I was (inaudible}.
That'd be fine.

CHAD REYES

3
4

Having first been duly sworn, testified

5

upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

6
7

8
9

BY MR. BOEHM:
Q

Thank you for being here.

Would you tell the jury

your name, please?

10

A

It's Chad Reyes,

11

Q

And what do you do for a living?

12

A

I work for the Unified Police Department.

13

Q

How long have you worked in law enforcement?

14

A

Approximately 16 years.

15

Q

And would you summarize your experience during your

16

17

last name is spelled R-E-Y-E-S.

career in law enforcement?
A

I started off in the corrections area in the jail,

18

I worked there for about a year, moved from there into

19

patrol, did some traffic investigation, and then I moved into

20

the violent crimes unit, where I served as a detective for

21

approximately eight years.

22

sergeant, and moved back to patrol for a short period of time

23

until I moved into K-9, and I currently supervise the UPD's

24

K-9 unit.

25

Q

From there,

I was promoted to

I think it's pretty clear that this case is about
69
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1

Q

2

74.

3

Exhibit 73?

4

A

Could you briefly describe what is depicted in State's

Seventy-three appears to be Mr. Sanchez 1 s right

5

hand, a photograph of his right hand that was taken at the

6

hospital at St. Mark's that day.

7

Q

And what is in State's Exhibit 74?

8

A

Seventy-four is a photograph taken at the hospital

9

that day of his left hand.

10
11

Q

A

They do.

MR. BOEHM: We would move to admit State's Exhibit

13

14

And do those photographs accurately depict what you

saw when you saw the defendant there in the hospital?

12

@

These are State's Exhibit 73 and State's Exhibit

70 - is it 73 and 74?

15

WITNESS: Yeah,

16

MR. BOEHM: State's 73, State's 74 that -

17

MR. DELLAPIANA: No objection.

18

THE COURT: They'll be received.

19

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 73 and 74 received)

20

Q

73,

74.

J

(BY MR. BOEHM) When you get to the hospital, do you

21

immediately begin to speak to the defendant, or what do you

22

do?

23

A

No,

I waited for some time before I spoke to the

24

defendant, waited for hospital staff to offer a treatment,

25

further evaluate him,

and I let them take care of him,

78
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1

basically,

2

before I tried to speak with him at all.
Okay.

Q

3

When did you begin to speak with him?

After he'd been assessed by the physicians and the
and I conferred a little bit with them,

4

nurses,

5

determined that we were at a point where I could attempt to

6

interview Mr. Sanchez.

7

Most of my questions,

Q

8

your testimony,

9

you have questions,

and then

I guess, for the remainder of

deal with that specific interview.

So,

if

it looks like you've got a large binder

10

there.

11

anything,

12

that refreshes your memory.

Please just let me know if you need to look at
I'll ask the judge and we'll see if it's okay if

13

A

Great.

Thank you.

14

Q

What address did the defendant provide to you as

his home address?

15
16

A

He provided 1743 East 3080 South, which is the

coordinate for Gregson Avenue,

17
18

Q

1- J
a

so the Gregson Avenue address.

And so whose home is that?
Roger Gary Warner's.

20

Q

Did you ask him for a phone number?

21

A

I did.

22

Q

What did he say?

23

A

He told me he didn't have one,

24

that he shared a

phone with Mr. Warner.

25

Q

Did you get any other information or do anything
79
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else before you began to question him?

2

A

I did.

As I mentioned,

I spoke with the doctors,

3

and then I also tried to assess him myself, make sure that he

4

was of mental ability, based on all the trauma, and then his

5

mention of the methadone that he had taken,

6

capable of talking to me; he was in a mental state he was

7

capable of responding to my questions and having a

8

conversation with me, a lucid conversation.

9

10
11

that he was

Q

What kind of questions did you ask him to verify

A

I asked him about his educational background,

that?
his

12

date of birth, his name spelling, the current day, the

13

current date at the time, his work history, basic questions

14

like that.

15

Q

In general, were his responses accurate?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Was there anything that was off?

18

A

He mentioned to me the - May 8 th

19

the date was, and it was May 5 th ,

20

that the date was May 8 th •

21
22

Q

Okay.

So,

-

I asked him what

obviously, and he told me

he was off by a few days.

But other than that, his responses were

accurate?

23

A

Correct.

24

Q

What did you do after you went through that

25

procedure?

80

l

A

After I went through that,

as part of my rapport

2

building process,

that was part of the rapport building

3

process as well,

4

just a brief analogy about truthfulness,

5

story similar to that to Mr.

but I typically start off my stories with

Sanchez.

6

Q

After you'd done this analogy,

7

A

I

offer - or I

and I offered a

advised Mr.

what did you do?

Sanchez of his Miranda

@.:

rights.

8
9

Q

And those are the same rights that we hear on any

10

television show where someone's being advised,

11

rights they have.

you know,

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

What did he say in response?

14 ,

A

He acknowledged that he understood each of his

15

rights,

16

present.

what

and he agreed to speak with me without an attorney
~)

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

I asked him what happened.

So what did he say after that?

I asked him to tel~ me

and initially his responses were fairly vague.

19

what happened,

20

He told me that he got into a fight with Angela.

I asked him

21

to elaborate, and he told me that he slapped her,

he thumped

22

her,

and then he called the cops.

23

Q

And how did you respond?

24

A

As I mentioned,

25

I felt that the brief explanation

that he gave me was fairly vague and lacked detail,

so I
81
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~

asked him to elaborate.

1
2

Q

And what did he say?

3

A

He told me that he slugged her a little bit,

4

that it went farther than it should have.

5

Q

Did he say when this fight began?

6

A

He said the night before,

7

~

i

I believe,

13

And so,

this interview that took place,

we' re still talking about the afternoon of May 5 th

then,

10

12

J

Okay.

Q

11 :

\Gi)

so last night,

was - were his words.

8
9

and

A

Correct,

Q

So,

•

probably around 4:30 p.m. on the - on the

5th•

of May 4 th

you took the term last night to mean the night

•

14

A

Correct.

15

Q

Did you find out more about how it began?

16

.

Yeah,

_

7\

I asked him how it began. He mentioned that

17 I it started the night before, and he told me that he pulled
18
·~

vi)

~

19

her hair,
Q

and - he got mad at her and he pulled her hair.
Okay.

Was there anything interesting about the

20

statement that he had pulled her hair,

21

evidence that might have been located at the scene?

22

A

Yeah,

in terms of the

there were some strands of hair that were

23 I

located in the house that were consiste:-it with some sort of a

24 i

physical assault where someone would be pulling hair from

25

another human's head.

82
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1

2 I

Q

What was the length of the defendant's hair when

you were (inaudible)

@

this interview?

3

A

The length of the defendant's hair was very short.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

Was I believe around shoulder length, maybe a

6

And the length of Angela Jenkins' hair?

iii)

little longer.

7

Q

Okay.

So the finding this hair - did you say

~

8

whether it was more pieces of Angela's hair being a little

9

bit longer, or of the defendant's being much shorter?

10
11

A

and

Q

inconsistent with the defendant's.

12
13

It was consistent with Angela's hair,

Q

What did he say after he said that he'd pulled her

hair?

14

~

A

He said that -

I again asked him to elaborate a

15,

little bit, and he mentioned again that he pulled her hair,

16

he slapped her,

17

was over from there.

18
19

Q

he said he choked her a little bit,

When he said that he was choking her,

and ~t

you know,

A

~

Choking is often depicted in movies and even maybe

21

from our own experiences as something that is easily

22

survivable, and often times when it's done in horseplay it

23

is-

25

why

is that significant in your training and experience?

20

24

G';

MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge,

I'm going to object.

~

This

seems to be some sort of speculative, perhaps irrelevant

~

83

G

•

.
•

e

1

opinion evidence.

2 I

from this witness.

3

THE COURT: Your response?

4

MR. BOEHM: I guess I can lay a little bit more

5

foundation.

6

is detailing the choking and the strangling that was

7

discussed by the defendant,

8

foundation that explained why -

9

•
•

e

I'm trying to lay the

MR. BOEHM: - he's asking the question .

11

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, Judge,

if I may,

I think it's

12

fair for the officer to testify as to what statements Mr.

13

Sanchez made to him about this.

14

starting off on something that was unrelated to this case

15

about what people see in movies or something,

16

irrelevant.
THE COURT: Okay,

21 !

But the question was,

it's abundantly

why don't you - why don't you

MR. BOEHM: There we go.
Q

Fair enough.

(BY MR. BOEHM) Have you received training as a

A

I have.

23

Q

And what's the basis for that training?

25

law

enforcement officer involving strangulation?

22

24

and

tailor your response to the questions that are posed?

19
20

•

and so if -

10

18

•

It's a very significant portion of the interview

THE COURT: Go ahead.

17

•

I don't think it's relevant or necessary

What's the

need for that training?
A

Just level of offense and level of injury that
84
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'[
I

could be associated with strangulation,

so it -

I guess to

I

2

I

keep it specific,

the difference between,

for example,

a

3

misdemeanor type assault versus an aggravated assault,

4

someone might be attempt - attempting or intending to inflict

5

serious bodily injury,

6

would allow serious bodily injury or even death to be

7

inflicted.

8

Q

So,

where

choking is definitely a method that

this is something that's important to you when

you're interviewing somebody.

9

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

He initially said that he only choked her a l i t t l e

When did he say that he choked her?

13

bit right at the end of the - right at the end of the

14

assault.

15

Q

And I would -

if we may,

there's a question that

16

you asked him,

and I think it's down on page nine of your

17

interview,

18

string of zeros before the number nine.

19

specifically at lines 247 and 249.

20

yourself?

it's Bates stamped Roman numeral 10.01, and a
I'm looking

Would you read those to

21

A

Okay.

22

Q

Is it fair to say that at that point in the

23

interview,

24

last night?

25

I

A

he said that the timing of the choking was just

Yes.

Il
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1

Q

Did you ask him anything else about that?

2

A

I did.

3

Q

Okay,

4

A

I asked him if she lost consciousness at all.

5

Q

And what did he say?

6

A

He said that she did a little bit.

7

Q

Did he elaborate?

8

A

I asked him to elaborate, and he said that she lost

consciousness and that he attempted to revive her on a couple

9

l4i

10

occasions by breathing for her.

11

Q

12 I
~

'""
~

13

~

~

Did he make any physical gestures to explain what

he meant by breathing for her?
A

No.

In fact,

I tried to get him to explain that a

14

little bit more,

15

specifically if he performed CPR or just mouth to mouth,

16

he just repeatedly,

17

the interview in different parts,

18
~

what did you ask him?

!

and I even offered -

I asked him
and

I think three or four times throughout
said that he would breathe

for her.

19

Q

Okay.

What did he claim to do after that?

20

A

He claimed that - actually,

let me -

I have my

21 l

chain of thought,

22

don't mind me referring to my notes here really quick?

I thought in the right order,

23

MR. BOEHM:

Is that okay,

24

THE COURT: Go ahead.

25

WITNESS: Thank you.

but if you

Your Honor?

86
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THE WITNESS:

l
2

time?

3

(BY MR. BOEHM)

Q

4

benefit,

5

that.

6

you gave,

just for the

jury's

and we'll break back into
This interview that

was it recorded?
It was.

8

Q

Okay,

10

and maybe,

I apologize for jumping around.

A

to,

Yeah,

let's talk about this,

7

9

Can you repeat your question one more

so we - what you're looking at and referring

what I'm looking at is a transcription of that report;

is

that correct?

11

A

That's correct.

12

Q

Okay.

I guess I'd like to know,

13

this breathing for her.

14

did you want to know about this fight?

A

15

Well,

he talked about

What else did you know,

or what else

I had seen Angela Jenkins prior to the

I initially had responded to the scene at Cherry

16

interview.

17

Hill and had entered the apartment momentarily with Detective

18

Park,

19

Ms. Jenkins' body were not consistent with the vague

20

responses that I was getting from Mr. Sanchez,

21

if he would elaborate on some of the other injuries that may

22

have been caused.

so I was aware that the amount and level of injuries on

so I asked him

•

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

I asked him specifically if he had kicked her,

25

And what did he say?

he stated that he had,

and

that he had used the heel of his foot,

87
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1

and stomped on her thigh,

or her hip area.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

I asked him if he could've kicked her anywhere

Anything else?

4

else,

5

and possibly on her shoulder.

6

objects,

7

jumping ahead a little bit as well,

8

keep these in order,

9

anywhere, and he stated that he had bit her on her arm,

and he i~dic3ted that maybe up towards her buttocks,

and he stated no,

I asked him if he used any

just his heel.

but in order to try and

I recall asking him if he bit her

10

asked him if he bit her anywhere else,

11

have,

12

and I

and he said he might

but he can't remember.
So,

Q

13

mouth.

14

like that?

15

And I'm kind of

A

he indicated that he used his feet and his

Did he ever use his hands or his arms,

He did.

or anything

After he mentioned those injuries to me,

I

16

asked him specifically about some injuries that I saw on her

17

stomach and her torso,

18

small,

19

explained to me that he had grabbed her stomach,

20

clenching or pinching and pulling on those as well.

21

as Dr. Reese had described,

oval injuries and so I asked him about those,

Do you have any questions about that,

22

23

they were

Q

No.

A

-

so,

in addition to those injuries,

and he

and was

or -

I asked him if

!
I

_____2_4---i1·---~~
i.;j>

25

had done anything else to her face,

and at that time he

informed me that he had grabbed her lip with his hands and
j

I
I

1
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1

pulled them down and to the side,

2

tearing and so forth in her mouth.

3

Q

which - which caused the

Was there anything that he said about just the

4

general injuries to the face?

5

been described, did he describe how that could've occurred?

6

A

Yeah,

The diffuse swelling that's

I asked him if he ever punched her.

He had

7

already mentioned that he thumped her and he slugged her,

8

those were his words that he used,

9

her with a close~ fist,

and I asked him if he hit

he admitted that he had once, but

10

then said that he repeatedly slapped her back and forth.

11

asked again,

12

congestion and bruising that was present on Ms. Jenkins'

13

face,

14

how her nose and mouth became so bloody, and he told me that

15

he had backhanded her.

because of the extreme amount of swelling and

I asked him how he continued to injure her face,

16

Q

And did he say how often?

17

A

He just said repeatedly.

her several times forward and backwards,

19

described the slapping,

20

specifically about the nose,

22

Q

and

He said that he slapped

18

21

I

I believe is how he

and then when I asked him
he said he backhanded her.

Was there any explanation - and it sounds like you

said something about using one hand;

is that correct?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Was there any explanation for why he wasn't using

25

the other hand?

@
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1

A

While I was at the hospital,

I observed him receive

2

treatment for a splint and a cast for his right hand,

3

pinky area,

4

-

5

was fractured,

6

asked him about the punching,

7

had punched Angela at least one time,

8

fracture in his hand occurred when he punched the wall,

9

when he punched Angela.

and I asked him about that,

the

and indicated to him

I indicated to him that his pinky knuckle on his right hand
and he told me that it has,

and that's how I

and when he admitted that he
but he claimed that the
not

10

Q

How long did he say that this fight went on for?

11

A

He said probably a couple hours.

12

Q

And without going into anything that Angela

13

might've said, was she making any - were there any reactions?

14

Where there any signs of distress that he told you about?

15

A

Yeah,

I asked him specifically about the choki~g,

16

and I asked if Angela was saying anything or reacting at all

17

to him when he was choking her and he said that she wasn't

18

saying much,

19

Q

20

this again,

21

fight lasted probably for a couple of hours?

she was just screaming.

What did he say - or,

I guess,

or when - let me back up.

when he talked about

So he said that the

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Did he say a time when it bega~?

24

A

He said it began last - last night,

25

again,

and then

he estimated that it ended about eight or nine in the

90
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morning.

1
2

ti)

Okay.

Q

3

match up,

4

you.

So,

the issue of a couple of hours didn't

necessarily,

with the time frame that he's giving
<$)

5

A

With his own statements,

6

Q

Okay.

i

9

Yeah,

back at all,
1

words,

I asked him at one point if she was fighting

and he stated that,

a little bit, were his

but not much because she's a woman.

Q

I also asked him

12 i

if - as I mentioned previously, if she lost consciousness at

13

all when he was choking her or during the assault,

14

said that she had,

15

revive her and - by breathing for her,

16

to a bath - to the bathtub, where he ran water over her head,

17

or he put her head under the water,

18

Q

Okay.

as I mentioned,

And,

ended,

20 !

this eight or nine,

21

this issue with her consciousness?

23

A
i

and he

~

and that he attempted to
and also by taking her

Q

he told me.

a moment or two ago I asked you when it

19

22

@

he choked her?
A

10
11

What did he say that he did - or what

happened - did he say anything more about what happened when

7

8

no.

and you said something about eight or nine.
the end of this fight,

When was

~

in relation to

At eight or nine is when - my interpretation of the

©

interview with Mr. Sanchez was that Ms. Jenkins lost

24

consciousness at least a little bit several times throughout

25

the assault.

At eight or nine,

it was my understanding from
91
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1

Mr. Sanchez that Ms. Jenkins lost consciousness finally and

2

was never able to be awakened again.

3

What did he claim that she did - or what did he

Q

4

claim to have done himself after she lost consciousness at

5

about eight or nine?

6
7

At eight or nine,

A

consciousness,

he said that when she lost

he lied down with her and took a nap.

8

Q

How long did he say he stayed asleep?

9

A

Approximately an hour,

is what I would assume.

10

don't remember if he -

11

specific question,

12

he fell asleep for - or he laid down with her at eight o~

13

nine,

14

would've been an hour or two later, depending on when that

15

was.

16

17
18

I don't remember if I asked him that

or if he gave me a time frame,

but he said

and then he called the cops after he woke up,

Q

whicn

And did he mention at all whether he had called

Gary before or after he called the police?
A

Yeah,

he said after he woke up and could no longer

19

arouse her or awaken her, he called Gary Warner and then

20

called the police after that.

21

Q

And what did he do after that?

22

A

He left the apartment,

23

I

indicated that he left the

apartment because he was scared.

24

Q

Did he say why he was scared?

25

A

I don't believe he gave me an exact reason why,
92
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! other than he couldn't wake Angela up.

2

~

Could I direct your attention to page 13 of your

Q

3

interview on line 346?

4

Roman numeral 10.01, string of consecutive zeros, and then

5

the number 18?

6

It's ending - Bates stamp number ~

Yeah.

A

(Inaudible conversation}

7

8

@

(BY MR. BOEHM) Maybe if you would turn back one

Q

page, to page 12, and look at line 345.

9

10

A

Okay.

11

Q

And then ldok at 346,

Q

12

refresh your memory.

13

scared?

14

your memory?

15

A

Having looked at that,

Yeah,

17

saying anything any more,
Q

does that help to refresh

basically what I said,

little bit more,

18

and see if that helps to

I believe the question was, why was he

16

~

just to elaborate a

is that she wasn't waking up,

she wasn't

~

and so he was scared.

What else did you want to find about - find out

about his actions after he left the apartment?

19

A

20

After he left the apartment,

the - any evidence that he may have taken with him from the

22

apartment,

23

during the assault,

24 l

might be.
Q

<iJ

I was curious about

21

25

--·---•➔--···-

so specifically clothing that he was wearing

Okay.

©

and where - what the location of that

And what did he say?

G)
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A

2

shirt that he had left behind in the apartment - in apartment

3

number 18, and that he was wearing green pants that he had

4

taken off at Gary's and left in Gary's bedroom,

5

white socks that he had taken off and left in Gary's bedroom.

6
~

Q

7

clothing,

8

him about?

9
~

\ii

@

A

Was there anything - were there any other items of
say,

a shirt or anything like that,

that you asked

The shirt - the blue shirt that was left behind,

the pants - the shirt was in the apartment still,

11

where he claimed to have left the blue shirt that he was

12

wearing, and then the pants and the socks were at Mr.

13

Warner's house.

that's

14

Q

Did he describe what kind of shirt it was?

15

A

He did.

16

He said it was a blue button-up shirt,

short-sleeve.
Q

18

\41)

as well as

10

17

vi)

He told me that he was wearing a blue button-up

Did you learn anything more about James and

Angela's relationship from talking to him?

19

A

I did.

I asked Mr. Sanchez approximately how long

20

he and Ms. Jenkins had been in a relationship,

and he alleged

21

about six months; however,

22

statement,

23

they were only in a relationship for about three to four

24

months.

even from Mr. Warner's own

and some of the other records,

it appears that

~

25

Q

I
I

!·--·--~Q

Is it possible that he might have lived with her
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1
2

for a brief time before they were in a relationship?
A

MR. BOEHM: Excuse me,

3

4

7

8
9

just one moment.

I

apologize.
THE COURT: Sure.

5

6

Yes.

Q

(BY MR. BOEHM} Where did this fight take place

inside of the apartment?
A

I asked Mr. Sanchez to describe that for me,

told me in the back bedroom.

and he

Just to confirm that we were

10

talking about the same bedroom - because it was a two-bedroom

11

apartment -

12

furniture that was in there,

and he mentioned the blue

13

mattress without the sheets,

and a TV and so forth,

14

were - we were sure we were talking about the same bedroom.

15
16

17

Q

I had him provide descriptions of some of the

so we

And what else did you want to find out about t~e

scene inside the bedroom?
A

I asked him if he attempted to clean it up at all,

18

because, as I mentioned,

19

and he mentioned that he did try to clean Angela up, and used

20

hydrogen peroxide, and also talked about taking her to the -

21

to the bathtub.

22

23

Q

I'd been in the apartment prior to,

Did he say anything more about any cleaning agents

like hydrogen peroxide or anything else?

24

A

Not that I can recall.

Not specifically.

25

Q

Did he say anything about why she would need to
95

•··

,·-··••·--

-···---- ----··•-•~

- - - .... --··-------- - - - -

_ _ _ _ _ _ _j

~

~

have her head placed under the faucet in the bathtub?

1
2

~

~

~

A

trying to fully arouse her or awaken her,

5

because he mentioned that she was bleeding profusely from her

6

face
Q

Okay, and how -

8

A

And mouth.

9

Q

Excuse me.

10

A

Just nose and mouth.

11

Q

Okay.

and then also

Was there any more to that?

No.

Sorry to interrupt.

How did her nose get so

bloody?

13

A
I

As I mentioned,

I

asked him about that

specifically, and he said that he backhanded her.
Q

I

think - I

wanted to ask you more about any of the

but correct me if I'm wrong,

16

facial injuries,

17 l

talked about this issue of pulling on the lips.
.A

Yeah,

you've already

I'd asked him, because of the - the lip

19

injury was so - so severe,

20

specifically, and he told me that he grabbed her lips,

21

i

22
23

24 i
\/1)

One was because he was

from the nose.

7

18

~

took his

4

15

i(i)

took it for - I

intentions there for two purposes.

14

~

I

3 !

12
vj

Just that she was -

25

I asked him about that

or

stuck his hands in her mouth, and pulled down and to the
side.
Q

According to the defendant, did Angela ever leave

the bedroom?
A

Yes.

Just on that one occasion where he assisted
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1

her to the bathroom or the bathtub,

2

little bit more alert by running her head under the water.

3 '

4

Okay.

Q

and tried to get her a

How did your questioning of the defendant

conclude?
Well, as I mentioned,

A

5

even throughout,

I had to -

as I asked

6

specific questions to him,

I had to try to -

his

7

questions and responses were always very vague.

8

asked him at the end about how Angela ultimately lost

9

consciousness for the last time,

and asked him about his

10

specific method of choking her.

He mentioned to me that he -

11

as I talked about,

12

says he used his hands only, and then as I questioned him a

13

little bit further,

14

choke her.

15

point,

16

that, it wasn't really having much effect,

17

end,

18

on top of her and placed his elbow in her throat,

19

wasn't having much effect either,

20

leaned into her as she was lying on her back on the floor.

21

After he did that,

22

said yes,

23

never regained consciousness from that point forward.

And so,

I

at the very beginning of the interview,

he

I asked him if he used anything else to

He told me that he got her in a headlock at one

similar to a headlock,

and that while he was doing

with Angela lying on her back,

and so at the very

and on the floor,

he got

and that

so he used his forearm and

I asked him if she blacked out, and he

that was the time that she blacked out, and she

24

Q

Was he clear about where her body was positioned?

25

A

I don't believe I had him describe exactly where in

i
I

I
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1

i

2 i

the room,
floor,

3 i
@

4 !

G,

~

A

~

He placed it across the front of her neck.

So,

I

asked him specifically just, you know,

7

neck,

8

and then your forearm,

9

finally caused her to lose consciousness for the last time.

10

13

on the front of her

while she's laying on her back, and you used your elbow

Q

and he agreed that that was how he had

Before she lost consciousness, though~ did she

respond in any way?
A

No.

He said that she blacked out and she didn't

say anything at all.

14

Q

What was his response?

15

A

He said that he - after that,

he laid down with her

16

and I think that's when he said that he laid down with her

17

and,

18

anything anymore, and so he called Mr. Warner and then called

19

the police.

20

Q

21
~

And, did he describe where he placed his

fore arm?

12

~

Okay.

so on her back.

6 I

11 l

Q)

face up,

Q

5

~

but it was clear that she was in ~he bedroom on the

22

after he woke up he was scared because she wasn't saying

But he was aware before he took this nap that she

had lost consciousness.
A

Yes.

I asked him if he was ever able to arouse her

23

or awaken her again after that last moment,

and he -

I asked

24 i

him when that was, when - approximately what time it was that

25

he used his forearm to chcke her,

and he said that was about
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1

eight or 9:0C

in

the morning that day.

2

MR. BOEHM: If I could have one moment, Your Honor?

3

THE COURT: Yes.

4

MR. BOEHM: I guess I have one last exhibit.

5

is marked State's Exhibit 78.

6

THE COURT: You may.

7

8

Q

May I approach?

(BY MR. BOEHM) Are you familiar with what that

exhibit, State's Exhibit 78, contains?

9

A

I am.

10

Q

Is that an accurate depiction of what - well,

11

This

tell

us what that is, briefly.

12

A

It's a driver's license photo of Ms. Jenkins.

13

Q

And is that an accurate reproduction of the photo

14

which you may have reviewed when you were investigating Lhis

15

case?

16
17

18

A

Yes.
MR. BOEHM: We'd move to admit State's Exhibit 78

into evidence.

19

THE COURT: State's 78 will be received.

20

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 78 received)

21

MR. BOEHM: Your Honor,

22

I just want to make sure.

Was there any objection on 78?

23

MR. DELLAPIANA: No.

24

MR. BOEHM: Your Honor, that's - concludes my

25

questioning of this witness at this time.
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1

CROSS EXAMINATION

2

BY MR.

DELLAPIANA:

3

Q

Good afternoon,

4

A

Afternoon.

5

Q

I'm just going to go through your earlier test~mony

Detective.

6

more or less in the order that you talked about things,

7

according to my notes,

8

clarification, to get a little bit more detail.

or

and ask some questions for

9

A

Sure.

10

Q

I think one of the first things you talked about

11

was how you got involved in the case,

12

got notified of 9-1-1 calls to the Cherry Hills apartments.

13

A

Correct.

14

Q

All right.

15

and that is because you

And eventually you learned that James

Sanchez had made those calls.

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

First one from inside the apartment number 18?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And then a second one after looking at the video

20

from the 7-Eleven,

21

A

Correct.

22

Q

Okay.

the second one from the 7-Eleven?

By the way,

is it -

is it correct that from

23

the front of the Cherry Hill apartments,

24

the 7-Eleven just ~p the road?

25

I believe so.

I don't recall.

you can actually see

I think -

I think
117
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I

I

1 ! you can.

2

Q

Now look at Exhibit 1 - are these in order,

3

A

No.

hope?

They used to be.

(Inaudible conversation)

4
5

I

(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Let me show you what's marked

Q

6

as State's Exhibit 1, and appears to show the front of the

7

Cherry Hills apart~ents, and then the - up the street on the

8

left are what looks like 7-Eleven signs.

9

be the scene we're talking about?

10

A

Yes,

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay.

Does that appear to

it is.

So,

it is visible from the front of the -

And it'd be especially - especially note -

14

you'd see if ambulances were on the street in front of the

15

house.

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Okay.

18

you - well,

19

investigation, you went over to the house that was known as

20

Roger Gary Warner's house,

You've indicated that there was clearly once

let me say it.

First you - soon, following your

right?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And there was some delay in the having response

/',:··,

"<:V

23

from the occupants.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Now, eventually you said James Sanchez came out.
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1

Let me ask you a question about that.

2

that at the time the came out,

3

induced stupor?

4

.'A.

Wasn't it fair to say

he was in some kind of a drug

Like -

I do~'t know that I'd say he was in a stupor.

I

5

assisted in contacting Mr. Sanchez when he came out of the

6

house, and he did alert us fairly quickly that he had -

7

believe even before we - even before he exited the house,

8

mentioned to negotiators that he had ingested -

9

said 17 methadone pills that he had taken from the victim.

10
11

Q

I
he

I think he

Well, but he was lethargic, mumbling, clearly under

the influence of some kind of a -

12

A

He - he -

I can say that he - he didn't have any

13

pants on, he was obviously - he - it was an unusual day for

14

him,

15

I honestly can't say that he appeared lethargic.

16

communicated with us.

17

start to appear lethargic then,

18

stretcher and so forth.

I'll say that.

can't - I

I

can't say that he appeaced -

I mean, he

Once he was in the ambulance,

he did

when he was laying on the

19

Q

All right.

20

A

But he was able to walk out of the house on his

Q

Okay.

21
22

own.
All right,

fair enough.

And then you -

23

because he was starting to exhibit these symptoms,

24

take him to the hospital.

you d~.d

---------· ·,o-••-····-·-·------------·-----· ·------.---·----------------...;.__25

A

Yes.
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Q

This is a little bit out of order of what I was

2

going to ask you,

3

him to the hospital and when you started to interview him?

4

··-·-,

A

!

~

but how long was it between when you took

We arrived at the hospital at 3:43,

5

according to the dispatch notes,

and I

6

what time I started to interview him,

7

approximately an hour after we arrived.

-

I

I believe,

can't say exactly

I would guess at
@

8

Q

And that was after he was treated with Narcone?

9

A

Narcan, Yes, sir.

10

Q

Narcan?

All right.

~

There was - you gave some

G)

11

testimony about - I'll try not to misrepresent it, but that

12 i

you thought that Roger Gary Warner was planning some sort of

13

a getaway plan or something,

for -

~

14

A

That's what Mr. Warner indicated to me, yes.

15

Q

Let me - isn't it - let me get to the rest of the

16

story.

Didn't he - didn't he tell you that the plan was to

17

let - his plan was to let James Sanchez get something to eat

18

and sleep a while and take his insulin,

19

in after that?

Q

and then turn himself
G;)

20

A

He -

21

Q

Does that sound familiar?

22

A

It does.

I think turn himself in was one of the

Q

I think Mr. Warner's intent was just to lead us

23

options.

24

away, and whether that was to buy time for James to eat or to

25

sleep, or possibly even to escape,

I don't know that Mr.

c ..

'o'ill/1,I
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l

War~er even knew what the result of that would be.

2

intended to lead us away.

3

MR. HAMILTON: Well, can I approach?

4

THE WITNESS:

5

THE COURT: You may.

6

He just

Sure.

(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Go ahead and look at this,

Q

and

7

see if it's recognized as an interview between Gary Warner

8

and you,

9

that refreshes yo~r recollection.

and read to yourself this section here,

10

A

Okay.

11

Q

So fair to say,

12

interview,

13

time to eat,

14

to turn himself in later?

15

A

he,

and see if

at least at this point of the

told you his plan was to try to give James some
sleep,

Yeah.

take his insulin,

What this does to me,

the idea he was going

and what it reminds me

16

of,

is that Gary intended to lead us away -

lead us away from

17

the home, meaning that James would be there by himself and

18

then Gary would give - make a deal with us later,

19

that he used,

20

and then James and Gary would turn himself in.

is the word

and talk James into meeting Gary at his work

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

So, that made me believe that it would allow James

23
24
25

time to leave the house.
Q

Oh,

I -

I know you -

I know you've asserted that

that's what you thought might be possibly happening,

I'm just
121

1

looking at the words there,

2

him eat,

3

turn himself in.

and it says the plan was to let

sleep, take some insulin,

and then would plan to

And then to meet Gary at Gary's work to turn

A

5

himself in.

6

Q

Thank you.

Let's see, one of the exhibits that you
I think waiting to talk to James at

7

identified when you were,

8

the hospital,

9

you started to interview him.

or maybe

(inaudible), maybe it was right after

10

once he came to his senses,

11

cooperative with the interview?

12

A

Yes, very much so.

13

Q

All right.
73 and 74,

By the way,

in that interview,

is it fair to say he was

There is an exhibit,

I think two

14

exhibits,

that show pictures of James' hands,

15

clearly with some abrasions on his - on one or both of the

16

hands.

17

A

I do.

18

Q

And,

Do you remember that exhibit?
Yes.
is it -

isn't it correct that when you ask him

19

about his hands,

20

was that he told you that that was from hitting the wall.

21

A

Yes,

22

Q

Okay.

and the broken - the one that was broken,

he did.
Just wanted to make that clear.

Thank you.

23

You also asked him some questions about whether he was trying

24

to clean up the apartment at some point.

25

questions about cleaning.

Just some general
@
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Just to kind of focus your attention on what I'm

going to ask about.

4

he was talki~g about the taking some -

5

if - you remember taking some peroxide and some first aid

6

stuff to try cleaning up?

7

question?
A

I do.

9

Q

All right.

~

~

~

iJ;

you asked him

Do you remember asking him that

And he's - and you're asking,

was that

10

before or after she lost consciousness, and he says that was

11

before?

12
~

I mean,

the -

13

That could've been.

A

I honestly don't remember.

If

if I can refer to my -

you -

14

Q

Yeah,

15

A

- transcript,

16

Q

17

A

Page 20?

18

Q

Yeah,

19

A

Okay.

20

Q

At maybe line 551.

21

A

Okay.

22

Q

So,

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Okay.

25

,

when

3

8

And just for clarification,

··-

the test -

sure.

Look at page what page is that?

20 of the interview -

X. 1. 00020.

is it - that was before she lost consciousness?

And he was trying to - and you had elicited

you testified about his admission that he had
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l

backhanded her,

2

remember that?

and that's what made her nose bleed, do you

3

A

Correct, yes.

4

Q

And that he was trying to - trying to get - trying

to slow the blood,

5

or stop the blood,

but it kept running?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

All right.

8

about this,

9

testified that James had admitted beating Angela and hurting

10

Okay.

I think you were pretty clear

let me go ahead and ask you anyway.

her in a number of ways,

hitting,

kicking,

You

and choking.

It's

c-.

~

that when you asked him if he used any

il

correct, however,

12

weapons, that he s~id that he did not.

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Okay.

Okay.

Let's see.

Oh.

One of the things

15

that you asked James about was whether - what Angela was

16

saying to him during this assault,

17

your answer was - and tell me if I got it wrong,

18

she wasn't saying much,
A

That sounds right.

20

Q

All right.

true,

It sounds right,

A.

That's what he told me.

23

Q

Okay.

Well,

interview again.

--·---- -•---

25

but it's not entirely

is it?

22

24

that he said

she was just screaming.

19

21

and I'm pretty sure that

A

let's look at the - let's look at the

Let me direct you to page 8.

-------------------t---

Okay.
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1

And just look at page 8 for a minute,

Q

2

read down there a little ways,

3

shouldn't take long.

4

I

A

6

No,

Q

it's double spaced,

don't see on this page where I

she was saying.

5

go ahead and
so i t

asked James what

Is there a line that you're referencing?

I'm just Yeah.

I want to make sure we're looking at

7

the same page.

8

you testified that that's what he answered.

9

going to direct your attention to some details here about

10

what he said she said,

11

said.

12

A

Okay.

13

Q

And you said,

14

No,

I don't -

I mean,

I'm just saying,
And now I'm

other than what you said he said she

she didn't say much,

she's just

In fact -

screaming.

15

MR. BOEHM: The State -

16

THE COURT: Counsel?

17

MR. BOEHM: - would like to raise an objection at

18

this moment,

Your Honor.

He's indicated that he intends to

19

ask statements that this alleged victim, Angela Jenkins,

20

made.

21

basis.

Those are clearly hearsay,

MR.

22

and we would object on that

DELLAPIANA: Your Honor,

23

confront this witness,

24

the case,

25

his omission of critical facts.

I would like to

who has misrepresented the facts of

and this cross examination will expose his bias and

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,___ , __ .. _,____________________________-t-_ _
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1

THE COURT: Counsel,

2

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:)

approach.

MR. BOEHM: Page 8 is the statements that

3
4

(inaudible)

5

elicit testimony with this witness regarding statements

6

(inaudible)

talked about regarding

apparently trying to

(inaudible).

MR. DELLAPIANA: As we always do when we cross

7
8

to his opening statement,

examine somebody about what they testified about, that's MR. BOEHM: The State,

9

in its direct examination of

10

this witness paid very careful attention to that transcript,

11

and I went through it in fine detail about if any statement

12

(inaudible) .

13

MR. DELLAPIANA: Nope.

14

MR. BOEHM: Their - the

(inaudible) that defense

15

counsel's talking about,

16

much later page,

17

discussed.

18

about what she was saying (inaudible),

19

anything (inaudible).

20
21

22
23

24

she didn't say much,

I think it's 24 or 25,

comes from a

something that was

And she said - he asked - he asked something
she didn't say

MR. DELLAPIANA: So they elicited that testimony.
That is not a complete,

accurate statement.

MR. BOEHM: We didn't introduce any statement of
(inaudible).

Screaming is not a statement.

MR. DELLAPIANA: You asked if she had said anything,

--·-·----

25

and he said no.
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MR. BOEHM:

1
2

I don't think what was said - what did

she say?
THE COURT: No,

3

the question was -

4

were strangling her,

did -

5

question was posed.

Not,

6

If you had -

8

(inaudible)

did she say anything at any tiMe?

If you're seeking to introduce

10

MR. DELLAPIANA: Uh-huh

11

THE COURT: - hearsay,

12

exception,

that's the - but that's the

impression -

THE COURT:

9

when you

it was in that context that the

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

7

came in,

(affirmative).
unless you can give me an

it's not corning in.

13

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well -

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: The confrontation clause.

16

THE COURT:

It's not coming in.

The confrontation clause has - you're

17

not eliciting statements of any individual that is accus~ng

18

him of anything at this point - you're introducing the

19

statements of somebody else, and that what you're seeking to

20

do.

21

his own statements.

22

clause,

23

it.

24

They're not his statements.

You can confront him about

As I understand the confrontation

eliciting somebody else's statements is not part of

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

he's misrepresenting what she

--------,--------- ·····------···--------------------------,-~

25

said.
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1

THE COURT: Okay -

2

MR. BOEHM: He didn't -

3

and we can direct

4

(inaudible).

5

Jenkins

(inaudible).

We can even recall him from

We never introduced a statement of Angela

(inaudible).
MR. DELLAPIANA:

6

I can voir dire the witness

I've got some other things while

I'm convinced that the right to cross

7

we're standing here.

8

examine is more than adequate for this situation, but Rule

9

106, the completeness rule,

10

when a party introduces part of a

recorded statement - this was a recorded statement THE COURT: I do (inaudible),

11

the completeness rule

12

speaks to completing that statement, where only a fragment of

13

the statement is brought in,

14

is pages away from the statement that -

not to bring in something that

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

16

THE COURT: - was allegedly brought in.

17

MR. DELLAPIANA: I disagree.

18

THE COURT: - as I see the completeness rule is,

I disagree.
So -

if

19

you're asking someone to read a fraction of a statement,

and

20

that statement on its own or that - without introducing ~he

21

complete - that whole complete statement,

22

misleading indication,

23

But,

it leaves a

then the completeness rule applies.

to seek -

24

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

I - that's where we are.

25

THE COURT: No, we're talking about something that
128

1

you're telling him is page - something arising on page 8.

2

This statement - the statement you were referencing is,

3

being told is on page 24.

4

in front of me.

5

completeness rule applies.

I don't know,

But, based on that,

6

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well ...

7

THE COURT:

8

MR.

So,

I'm

I don't have those

I don't believe that: the

if that's your basis -

DELLAPIANA: Well,

I'm going to ask the question

in a different way.

9

10

THE COURT: Well -

11

MR. DELLAPIANA: If he wants to -

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BOEHM: Yeah,

14

- you better clear it through me.

I would ask for that (inaudible)

that he can't just (inaudible).
THE COURT: Yeah.

15
16

tainting the jury.

17

to ask.

18

No.

I don't -

I don't want this

You tell me what it is that you're going

MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay.

Well,

I'm going to ask a

19

question regarding Mr. Sanchez's explanation for the -

20

the assault.

21

THE COURT: Then -

22

MR. BOEHM:

23

MR.

for

(Inaudible) -

DELLAPIANA: This is something that goes to his

24

own statement.

Regardless of the truth of whether - of

25

anything she said,

he believed -
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THE COURT: Then it doesn't - but it's not a

l
2

statement against the party.

3

arguably self serving.

It's his own statement that is

4

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

5

THE COURT:

6

it, then that's fine.

that's for the jury to -

If he wants to take the stand and say
But -

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, tell you what, we can spend

7

8

the rest of the afternoon with me cross examining this guy on

9

the record and send it up on appeal then,

10

defense.

because that's the

That's our defense.
MR. BOEHM: I mean, we filed a motion in limine that

11
12

was - talked about the 412, we talked about this yesterday,

13

everybody knew that this was going to be a tactic that might

14

be employed, but I think that everybody has to recognize that

15

either one doesn't allow the statement unless it's offered

16

against

17

(inaudible) cannot ask this witness -

(inaudible), defense counsel represents the defendant

18

MR. DELLAPIANA: I think we used that argument.

19

THE COURT: Yes, you did.

20,

MR. DELLAPIANA: I'm -

(inaudible),

21

said,

22

to introduce a statement of my client.

23

I specifically

I am not using a party opponent language rule as a way
I -

THE COURT: That's true, what you said is that you

24

would elicit it through somebody else's testimony.

25

I said to you is,

And what

if you're seeking to introduce it through
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J;

it needs to be consistent with the rules of

evidence,

3;

said - and I also said that if you,

4

the right to testify,

5 l

But, if he - if you want to put that in,

6 [

it on the basis of hearsay.

and it cannot be a statement of the individual.
you know,

I

clearly he has

he clearly has a right not to testify.

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

7

you're not eliciting

tell you what,

Your Honor.

I

8

will attempt to ask some different questions about different

9

things,

and then when I'm done with what is hopefully

10

unobjectionable testimony,

11 I

everybody 1 s attention that I'm ready to make -

I ' l l either -

I'll bring it to

THE COURT: We will discuss this off the record with

i

the jury - out of the presence -

13
14

MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah.

15

THE COURT: - of -

16

MR. BOEHM: Well,

17

~

somebody else,

2

12
~

,

t

Okay.

and my concern is that -

I mean,

the Court's asking what he - what defense counsel intends to

18 I

ask,

because defense counsel seems unfortunately opposed to

19

the Court 1 s ruling, and I think -

20

MR. DELLAPIANA: True.

21

MR. BOEHM: Right?

Anyway,

go ahead.

And I think the issue is,

22

there's a very big difference between what

(inaudible)

23

yesterday when the State asked a question and got an

24

unexpected response,

25

question.

it was not elicited by the State's

And defense counsel thinks he's going to say,
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1

Well,

what did defendant say about this?

2

about this,

3

and he's done it intentionally,

4

admissible,

5

I would ask for a warning that he not do that.

(Inaudible)

I
I

say

and explain that it - the cat's out of the bag,

I

and knowing that it's not

that it's hearsay and that it can't be used.

6

THE COURT: Don't tempt me, Mr. Dellapiana.

7

MR. DELLAPIANA:

I can't -

I ' l l tell you -

So

I'm going

to do my best -

8

THE COURT: Your responsibility is - you need to

9

10

your responsibility is to put in,

if you wish to put in

11

evidence that would support a - by a preponderance of the

12

evidence a standard that you've

(inaudible} on some basis.

13

MR.

DELLAPIANA: Sure.

14

THE COURT: Admissible evidence.

15

MR.

16

THE COURT: But, you're not going to be introducing

DELLAPIANA: Right.

17

or leading into something that would be objectionable

18

statements.

19

MR. DELLAPIANA: We'll see.

20

THE COURT: Just to get that on the record -

21

MR. DELLAPIANA:

22

THE COURT: - that will not happen.

23

MR. DELLAPIANA:

I will try not to do that.

24

THE COURT: No.

No.

25

MR.

I may end up the afternoon with my

DELLAPIANA:

I will try.

You will not do that.

132
I

"- ··--···· -

-

. ~·· ...

-

'

- ..

-

-

G

client in custody,

but not on trial.

2

(End of sidebar)

3

MR. BOEHM: Your Honor,

can we just make a finding

4

that the State has objected based on the hearsay and hear

5

what the Court's ruling on that -

THE COURT: The State has objected; I have sustained

6

the objection.

7

MR. BOEHM: Thank you, Your Honor.

8
9

Q

(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Okay.

This cross examination

may be shorter than I intended.

10

The length of the fight - you asked him about how

11

12

long the fight went on.

13

A

I did.

14

Q

And he said it was for a couple of hours.

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

You described it as last - him saying another time

17

i t was last night.

18

A

I do.

19

Q

Okay,

Do you remember that?

is that fair to -

20

mean sometime before dawn?

21

happened last night,

22
23

24

1

I

-

I

I mean,

I

Q

All right.

we refer to - oh,

it

could be in the middle of the night.

would assume so.

A

for most people that can

Yeah.

You asked him about - he told you that

he had choked her and that she kind of lost consciousness,

i - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·-···--·--·---------------------:--25 1·

right?
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1
2

words,

3
4

He said a little bit.

A

In any case,

Q

losing consciousness,
A

Yes.

6

Q

Okay.

he - when it looked like she was
he would breathe for her.

Like, did you get that as some kind of

attempt at CPR or -

8
9

think those were his

yeah.

5

7

~

I asked him specifically, because I was confused

A

myself,

and he just repeated that he breathed for her.

I

10

asked him if he performed CPR, meaning chest compressions,

11

and he said,

12

mouth to mouth?

13

that,

14

no,

just - he just breathed for her.

So I

said,

And he nodded his head or something like

I can't remember.
Q

Okay.

All right.

15

-

16

she lost consciousness.

Good.

Let me ask you about the

the last time - you gave some testimony about the last time

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

And he said,

this -

I think you said - testified

19

that he said it was something around eight or nine o'clock in

20

the morning?

21

A

That's what he told me,

22

Q

All right.

23
24

25

she took the pills,
A

yes.

And that it was - and that was after
that's when it started.

Remember that?

I remember him telling me that she took some pills,

and I think that was at the beginning of the interview,
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Q;

l

towards the - towards the first part,

2

time I asked him if he - if she lost consciousness,

3

she took some methadone,

4

in that same area of the interview.

5

@

7

want to see what I'm looking at?
A

Okay.

9

Q

You said, did she ever pass out and lose

A

Yes.

12

Q

And he says, Well,

too.

16

Yes.

---~

Q

--·

then it started."

"a little bit, and then -

a lot of pills, too.

"well,

After she took the pills,

Then it started.

Okay.

Got that?
she took

it started."

And we're laying there,

and she -

19

,.iJ

He said,

15

18

she took a lot of pills, though,

After she took the pills,
A

17

~

and that's at line 250, right?

11

14

vi

just in case you

8

consciousness,

was

and there were - then they were laying down,

and - and do you want to look at page 9,

13

"8

Right,

he said

and then she lost consciousness,

6

10

.;;;

Q

I asked - the first

MR. BOEHM: Your Honor,

I'm going to object again.

20

I think that what he's trying to do again is use hearsay

21

that's inappropriate,

coming from -

22

MR. DELLAPIANA: Hearsay?

23

MR. BOEHM: - the lips of his own client,

24

801,

25

it's inadmissible.

subject to

it's not being used against the party opponent, and so

... ~.-
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1

MR.

DELLAPIANA: This provides context for the

direct examination.

2

3

THE COURT: Counsel, please approach again.

4

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

5

THE COURT: What are we talking about now?

6

MR. BOEHM: What (inaudible),

7

I'm not sure he's -

but -

8

MR. DELLAPIANA: Page

9

THE COURT: What -

10

I don't want

(inaudible)?

MR. DELLAPIANA: He talked about the last time that

11

she lost consciousness was when he choked her.

12

interview,

13

after she took the pills.

Here,

in the

it says the last time she lost consciousness was

14

MR. BOEHM: And that's -

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: And they went to sleep,

16

woke up,

he realized she was non-responsive,

17

the police.

but then he

and he called

18

MR. BOEHM: Okay -

19

MR. DELLAPIANA: That was totally misrepresented.

20

MR. BOEHM: This already came in on direct,

21

don't know (inaudible)

22

did he lay down with her?

23

(inaudible) gets three or four more questions about what his

24

client said,

I think

statement,
Yeah,

and so I think

so I

(inaudible)

that's what he told me,

(inaudible).

MR. DELLAPIANA: He's the one that's asked -

25

II
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elicited evidence about what my client said.

l

2

MR. BOEHM: We don't need (inaudible) -

3

MR. DELLAPIANA: And we have to have -

4

THE COURT: Please -

5

MR. DELLAPIANA: - the context of -

i

6

THE COURT: - keep -

7

MR. DELLAPIANA: -

8

MR. BOEHM: We've already elicited the testimony

leaving important things out.

I~

9

10

that your client laid down with her after she lost
consciousness.

MR. DELLAPIANA: And you don't want me to ask any

11

12

questions about it.
MR. BOEHM: It's the statements that I'm concerned

13
14

I mean (inaudible) -

about.

15

THE COURT: No,

16

MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay, whatever you say,

17

you can't.
I'll

attempt-

18

MR. BOEHM: You can clarify that by saying that,

19

during direct examination you testified that my client said

20

he laid down,

21

to get

22
23
24

is that correct?

Yes.

I mean,

you're trying

(inaudible) the statements of your client.
MR. DELLAPIANA: Explain - get the rest of the

context of what he said, other than the little bit that he THE COURT: Okay,

and you want - and your question,

- - - - - - - - - - - ------·-------•
25

what is the question you want to pose?
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Isn't it true that he said i t was

1
2

after that she took the pills,

3

consciousness?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. DELLAPIANA: I asked that,

I thought you already did ask that.
and what was it that

Well, then I was going to say, and then they laid

6

he said?

7

down,

8

responsive, and then he called the police.

and then he woke up,

THE COURT:

9

and she - he found her non-

I will allow that.

10

MR. DELLAPIANA:

11

MR. BOEHM: Fair enough.

12

THE COURT: That's fine.

13

(End of 3idebar)

14

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

15

(inaudible) question.

if we keep doing it like

this, maybe it will take a long time.

But -

16

MR. BOEHM: The State would withdraw its objection.

17

THE COURT: Thank you.

18

--•--.-·

is when she lost

Q

(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) So,

I was asking about what you

19

testified about on direct examination, about Angela losing

20

consciousness, and we just had got through the part where you

21

actually read the -

22

were interrupted,

23

she said,

24

started,u right?

from the transcript, and just because we

and I want to get back to where we were,

after - he said,

uAfter she took the pills,

then it

..

25

A

Yes.
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0

wasn't breathing,

2

And,

right,

we were laying,

and she kind of

or wasn't responding to me, right?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

And I was all - uwhen I woke up,

5

that's all I

remember," right?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

"So I called the cops."

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

After the - you had two interviews with him,

10

A

I had one and then we took a break and then we

12

Q

Oh,

same one.

13

after the break,

14

questions?

Okay.

In between the break,

A

Yes.

16

Q

He asked you,

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And you obviously told him that she had not.

20

A

Right.

21

Q

And,

22

A

What do you mean by -

1

is she okay?

Did she make

fair to say that he took that pretty hard.

MR. BOEHM: Objection,

calls for,

again,

Also

calls for speculation.

probably a statement by the defendant.

THE COURT:

25

in effect,

it?

23 i

24

or

you asked him if he wanted to ask any

15

17

right?

continued the same one.

11

.~

After - okay.

I think it is a bit speculative.

Why
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1

don't you -

Q

2

MR. DELLAPIANA: Be more specific?

3

THE COURT: Just - no,

4

reaction Mr. Sanchez may have demonstrated.

5

6

just as to whatever physical

(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Physical reaction,

Q

I don't

I mean, did he appear to you to be suicidal?

know.

7

~

Physically?

A

I don't know how you assess that.

8

mean,

9

physically assess that unless they're committing acts.

10
11

for someone that's suicidal,

Q

Well,

I

G

I don't know how you

he asked you to shoot him, would that be

~

evidence that he's -

12

MR. BOEHM: Again,

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BOEHM: Move to strike.

15

THE COURT:

16

(Inaudible conversation)

17

THE CO0RT: Counsel, please approach.

18

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

19

THE COURT: I believe I may have limited Mr.

objection,

this is hearsay.

Sustained.

It will be stricken.

20

Dellapiana in that -

21

more than I had intended to.

22

response.

23

response that the defendant may have displayed.

24

going to allow the State - or specific statements

25

(inaudible) .

I

think I

4v

~

r;;;,

in that last interchange a little b~t
I narrowed it to physical

would allow any description of emotional

~

But I'm not
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1

MR. BOEHM: And I think that's fine.

2

MR. DELLAPIANA:

3

THE COURT: Okay,

4

if you wish.

(Inaudible).
so you're welcome to pursue that,

Because you're

(inaudible) question was -

5

MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay.

6

THE COURT: -

7

(End of sidebar)

8

9

(BY MR.

Q

(inaudible).

DELLAPIANA)

Let me jump back to where we

were a minute ago when I was asking you about James' response

10

to your informing him that Angela had passed away,

11

and I said,

12

your answer,

13

A

He did appear distraught.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

He appeared distraught after I told him that,

16

Q

All righ~.

fair to say he took it pretty hard,

and I

-

and what was

or what is your answer to that?

Fair enough.

yes.

I want to ask you about

17

something like totally unrelated to the interview of James

18

Sanchez,

19

of Roger Gary Warner, which is in section 3,

20

page 1 7.
A

21
22

23

~--1-

here.

and it's something that is related to your interview
around about

If you want to switch I'm going to have to - yeah,

I'm sorry,

what page,

open this book up

sir?

Q

Seventeen.

A

Okay.

Q

And you were here and saw me asking questions of

. -·· ····•--•----··---•- --·· -·--··-·-·-·•------·------·-······--··-·--·----·----···-•--·- -----•····--1

~~

_J

_

1

Mr. Warner about how - what the emotional state of James was

2

when James called Gary to come and get him,

3

I asked - and Gary didn't remember,

4

remember being interviewed by Detective Reyes,

5

yeah,

6

telling Detective Reyes that James was crying?

I

remember that.

And then I

and I said, Gary,

A

I do remember your questions, sir.

8

Q

- and he says,

10

remember if I said that.
years ago?

do you

and he said,

said, do you remember

7

9

and you remember,

And he says -

this was three years ago,

I don't

Is that what he told you three

That James was crying?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And you - I mean, this interview, this was written

13

like - this was done within hours of - a couple hours of the

14

arrest,

15

A

right?
This is actually a transcript of a recording,

16

it's not a report,

17

yes.

so it is word for word from a recording,

18

Q

All right.

19

-~

Made at the time of the interview.

20

Q

All right, which was,

21

so

And the recording was made -

itself, within an hour or two

of the arrest.

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Very well.

24

If I can have just a minute,

25

T HE COURT: Certainly.

Judge?
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1

MR.

DELLAPIANA: Your Honor,

2

further questions for -

3

further questions for Detective Reyes,

4

ask them at this time.
THE COURT: Fair enough.

6

MR.

7

THE COURT: Fair enough.

8

Do we have redirect?

9

MR. BOEHM: Yes,

BY MR. BOEHM:

13

,..;}

Q

There's a couple of,

I guess we could call them

14

housecleaning issues,

15

questions about what you've been asked.

16

Cutler testified,

17

you know, multiple sources on a pillow.

18 i

pictures of -

and then I ' l l just ask you a couple of
You saw when Derrick

and he talked about a match,

MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge,

19

but there was,

The jury has seen

I'm going to object.

20 !

seems well beyond the scope of my cross examination.

21 i

on a pillow?

This
Matches

MR. BOEHM: And this is just for clarification,

22
23 I

vi}

You may proceed.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

s,$l

~

but I'm not going to

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

12 i

I have some

DELLAPIANA: And suggest we have a recess.

11 i

)

let me put it this way,

5

10

I don't have any

if-

24 !

MR.

25

MR. BOEHM: Okay.

DELLAPIANA: Of what?

Fair enough.

I
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THE COURT: No.

1
2

(BY MR.

Q

I

Sustained.

i

BOEHM) Defense asked you about the phone

3

calls,

the 9-1-1 calls.

Did the defendant admit to you

4

during his interview that he made those phone calls?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

When the defendant suggested to you that he was

7

cleaning her up to render her physical aid, what portion of

8

the interview was that in?
I

9

10

11

12
13

believe it was right about the center.

I

can't

be sure without referring back.
Q

Okay.

about Narcan.
A

Defendant - or defense counsel asked you
What is Narcan?

It 1 s a substance that is given to individuals who

14

have overdosed on Jpiates,

15

of narcotics, and its function is to inhibit the effects of

16

opiates,

17

nervous system, suppressing respirations,

18

Narcan inhibits that reaction from the opiates, and so,

19

effectively stops an overdose.

so heroin,

methadone,

those types

so as Dr. Reese was talking about suppressing the
and so forth,

the

20

Q

And did you witness the defendant receive Narcan?

21

A

I did.

22

Q

And did you ask him about the effects of the Narcan

23

on him?

24

A

I did.

25

Q

And what did he say?
J. 4 4
··-··- ·-------·-·-·•-·-•-•-•·-••-·---·--···-----

He said at first he thought that he was having some

l

2

sort of reaction because the effects were so instantaneous,

3

and then he started to feel better afterwards.

4

Q

And that was before you interviewed him.

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Defense counsel asked you about the loss of

7

consciousness, and I'd like to be really clear about that.

8

Was there more than one time in your interview with the

9

defendant that he referred to loss of consciousness?

10

A

Several -

11

Q

(Inaudible) Jenkins?

12

A

Several times.

13

Q

And when he talked about the loss of consciousness

14

and the - the effect of pills that Angela Jenkins had taken,

15

what part of the interview was that?

16

A

The very first part.

17

Q

Okay.

And so as the interview progressed,

18

talked about her loss of consciousness later in the

19

interview, did he talk about the pills any more?

20

21
22

23

and he

No.
Q

In fact,

when you got to the end of your interview,

did you also talk to him about her loss of consciousness?
A

And I believe that conversation - or that part of

24

the conversation was very clear,

talking about the last time

25

she lost consciousness where she never woke up again.
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1
2

Q

And directly preceding her loss of consciousness,

he talked about strangling her.

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

And that was with his forearm.

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Defense counsel asked you if, during this - well,

7

after this break, if the defendant was distraught.

8

any way for you to know what the defend~nt was distraught

9

about?

10

A

No.

11

Q

So, he could've been distraught about his own

12

@

circumstances.

13

A

14

Yes.

MR. BOEHM: No further questions.

15
16

Was there

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. DELLAPIANA:

17

Q

Just briefly,

(inaudible) some questions here about

18

the order of the interview.

Isn't it true that you kind of

19

jumped back and forth,

and repeated questions about different

20

things that happened?

Like,

21

the end?

22

- you said what happened, he says, well - I won't include the

23

whole conversation,

24

her,

25

police."

the beginning and the middle and

I mean, you - for example, his first answer to you

ufor some particular reason I got mad at

I hit her, thumped her,

I guess, and then I called the
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Which kind of,

3

the -

the assault,

I mean,

covers the whole series of

right?

4

A

Not in the slightest.

5

Q

Well,

I mean,

And that's why I asked him -

it covers the time frame.

6

rephrase.

7

time frame in one sentence, basically.

Let me

It covers from the beginning to the end of the

8

A

In,

I guess,

the most vague sense possible,

9

Q

Oh,

it's not very specific.

I mean,

yes.

it's specific,

10

I was angry,

11

right?

12

A

I hit her,

13

Q

Specific,

14

A

I guess it would depend on definition of thumped

I hit her,

I called the police,

I thumped her,

16

different assaulting injuries,

17

specific and all encompassing.
Q

Okay.

19

A

I -

is -

if thumped her meant a wide variety of

her.

18

I called the police,

just not detailed.

15

Thumped her -

that's specific,

I'm sorry,

sir,

then maybe that would be

I'm not trying to be -

I

j,1st -

20

I don't know exactly what you're - what you're meaning by,

21

those three words are specific to the entire event.

22

Q

They're specific,

they're just not detailed.

My

23

point is that after that you went into detail and different -

24

and repeated things over and over,

25

of questions,

and,

you know,

asked lots

and -
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A

Yes.

2

Q

All right.

3

answers were at the beginning,

4

and some were at the end.

5

mind.

It's not really a - yeah.

Withdraw the question.

Never

I think it's obvious.

Nothing further at this time.

7

THE COURT:

Do the members of the jury have any

questions of this witness?

Okay, please write it down.

Counsel, please approach.

9

10

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

11

(Inaudible conversation)

12

THE COURT: Actually,

counsel?

I

think that -

13

think what I'm going to say is that it's not

14

because it goes into a question -

15

at another time,

(inaudible),

and that's not relevant to the -

(Inaudible conversation)

17

(End of sidebar)

18

THE COURT: All right.

I am declining to ask that

19

question as we all concur it's not a legally permissible

20

question.

22

Okay?
MR. BOEHM: The State has no further questions for

this witness,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

23
24

I

into contact that occurred

16

21

-··"

and some were in the middle,

6

8

---•---

I mean - and some of the questions and

down.

----------------------·--

--··-··

MR. REYES:

25

You may step

Thank you.
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THE COURT: And then,

l
2

anyway,

3

do not discuss the case with anyone or allow anyone to

4

discuss it in your presence.

5

anything about the case.

6

anything,

7

all of the evidence has been received and the matter is

8

turned over to you for deliberation.

9

so we will take a recess.

again,

Do not attempt to investigate

Do not make up your mind about

or anything about - related to the evidence until

10

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

11

THE COURT: All right,

12

Mr.

13

MR. DELLAPIANA: So,

14

THE COURT: These will all become part of the
record,

you may be seated.

Dellapiana?
those questions are all -

absolutely.

16

MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay.

17

So,

Very good.

I had two reasons for requesting the recess.

18

One is that I'd like,

19

record,

in order to make a proffer for the

20

anticipated asking without the jury present,

21

record,

22

more time to talk about -

I wanted to go ahead and ask the questions I'd
just to make a

and then we're going to need to have a little bit

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. DELLAPIANA: Something else.

25

THE COURT: - decisions.

-~~-----------~

You're admonished,

Please rise for the jury.

15

,:.':\

it is about time for a break

Mr. Sanchez's -

~----------------
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MR. DELLAPIANA: Yes.

l

-- -- ...... -----

...,._.,.__ -

So, if we - kind of

2

suggesting, unless somebody wants a break right now, we'll

3

just him (inaudible) take a break.
THE COURT: Detective Reyes,

4
5

stand, please.

6

oath.

if you'll take the

And again, you're reminded you're still under

And this is solely for purposes of proffer.
MR. DELLAPIANA: Correct.

7

CROSS EXAMINATION

8

BY MR. DELLAPIANA:

9

10

Q

All right.

You had testified that James Sanchez

11

told you that he'd gotten mad at Angela Jenkins and began to

12

assault her; is that correct?
Uh-huh (affirmative).

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

All right.

her,

15

He also told you why he'd gotten mad at

right?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

That because he thought MR. BOEHM: Can I object?

18

I

just want to make sure

19

- we're just making this record so that he has a record for

20

his appeal and for -

21

THE COURT: That is correct.

22

MR. BOEHM: Okay.

Then I won't make any further

objections.

23

24

THE COURT: Okay.

25

MR. BOEHM: Thank you.
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1

MR. DELLAP!ANA: And we should probably also note

2

our - the reasons for the objection at this point,

3 i

to go ahead and say why you objected t.o this line of

4

questioning we're about to try to engage in?
MR. BOEHM: Right.

5

~

vJJ

4b

~

~

And the State's objection was

6

that he's trying to admit his own client's statement through

7

this detective.

8

court statement from a non-testifying witness,

9'

meet some exemption of the hearsay rule.

Normally if you're trying to admit an out of
you have to

The most common

10

that we see is under 801 when you're asking for the statement

11

of an opponent's - or an opponent's statement.

12

the defense counsel is asking the State's witness about his

13

It's not an opponent,

In this case,

and so i t ' s a

i

own client's testimony.

14 .

self-serving statement,

15

under any rules or exemptions to the rules of hearsay.

16

inadmissible,

17

statements.

18 I

any statements that the defendant made regarding what the

19

alleged victim,

20

and we don't believe that it fiL;

therefore,

it's

this doesn't help to complete any

The State was very careful in maneuvering around

Angela Jenkins,

might have said,

statements that he might have said,

1

21
~

you want

or any

that were:1 ' t inculpatory.

MR. DELLAPIANA: And the defense believes that these
-

22
23

this line of questioning is admissible under the Sixth

P•JT1endment and the defendant's

r iqht to confront and cross

i

24

examine the witnesses,
1

- - - - - - - - -

"

25

:

i

____

➔-

- - - • •

in particular on direct examination,

- - - - - - - - - - -

----•---•

--

the State had elicited evidence that,

----•---

r-•-

I
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I

in the defense's

I
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1
2

I
I

I
II

perspective, omitted facts that should be - we should be able

@

to require in our cross examination to provide - and also the

I

3

! defense has cited the Rule 106, Rule of Completeness, which I

4 :

believe i~ general provides that when one party introduces

5

part of a statement,

6

parts of the statement,

7

necessary to provide context or as in otherwise - otherwise

8

relevant to the direct - part of the statement previously

9

offered,

10

@.

the other party can introduce other
or the whole statement even,

even if it's not in the same little part of the

statement.

11

@

THE COURT: And with respect to the claim regarding

12

the Rule of Completeness, and I'm trying to pull up that

13

rule,

since I don't seem to have my copy of the rules present

14

-

there it is.

15

Completeness goes to when there is a fragment of a sentence,

16

or a fragment of a paragraph,

17

in fairness,

18

that limited statement,

19

then that's when the Rule of Completeness applies.

20

does not necessarily -

21

when we are addressing parts of an interview that are,

22

represented to me,

23

implicating the Rule of Completeness,

24

@

oh,

©

I had concluded that the Rule of

that is being introduced,

but

@

to get a full context of that - of the import of
the whole statement should be read,
And ~t

@

I do not believe that it's implicated

20 or more pages apart,

as was

that that is not

~

as I understand it.

MR. DELLAPIANA: Defense also offered these -

the

--·•--•"

25

content of these - defendant cross examination under Rule

®
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~

803-4,

l

it goes tc the defendant's state of mind.

~

Let me add a little bit more explanation to that

2

~

3

argument than we made at the brief bench conference.

4

that is that,

5

\J)

.j)

...ii)

~

..:;JJ

~'
~

1

as a - in regards to -

And

I think that 803-4 in

and of itself is a hearsay exception.

6

THE COURT: Correct.

7

MR. DELLAPIANA: But I also would like to offer this

8

information under - as offering it not necessarily for the

9 I

truth 0£ the matter,

in which case it's not hearsay at all,

10

but to explain Mr. Sanchez's action.

11

make that argument at the bench,

12 !

chance to respond to that one before I go any further.

13

MR. BOEHM:

Since I didn't clearly

I'd like to give the State a

I haven't looked up Rule 803,

and I

want

14 I

to look that up before I make my response.

15

respond directly to the assertion that it's not a hearsay

16

statement because it's not offered for the truth.

17

he's offering that to show that the defendant believed that

18

Ms. Jenkins had some type of affair with someone other -

19

would cause him to feel that way.

20

have felt that way.

21

offered for the truth of the statement.

So,

But I would

Otherwise,

Clearly

that

he wouldn't

I can't imagine how it's not being

THE COURT: And I would say that under 803, parens

22
23 I

3,

the rule provides a statement of the declarant's then

24

existing state of mind,

25

memory or belief t~ prove the fact believed, which I believe

t'

but not including a statement of
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J.

is exactly what Mr. Dellapiana's seeking to introduce i t for .

2

So,

3

state of mind exception.

I do not believe that it falls within the then existing

4

MR. BOEHM:

I have nothing further to add.

5

MR. DELLAPIANA: And then,

Judge,

I - did you

6

already address the (inaudible) to explain his conduct,

7

provide context, and not necessarily for the truth of whether

8

she was having an affair,

9

so that's what made him angry,

but that that was his belief,

and

what made him assault her?

10

THE COURT: I'm sorry,

11

MR. DELLAPIANA: So, that was 801 -

I'm not following you.
I think i t ' s C2,

12

that says that a statement which is not offered for the truth

13

of the matter is not hearsay.

14

want to offer either - want to elicit that James either

15

said he believed, that's what he believed, he was - that she

16

was having an affair, and that she had,

17

or at least he said that she admitted it to him, and that's

18

what made him so angry.

19

whether she had an - the affair or not,

20 '

subsequent conduct and -

21

Right?

So,

I'm offering -

in fact,

I

just

admitted it,

That is it not for the truth of

THE COURT: Well,

but to explain his

then I think you bring it exactly

22

under 803-3, and it does not respond to - it's - it cannot be

23

admissible for a statement of belief.
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

24
25

argument,

I think it's a separate

and I'm offering it as a separate argument.

154
..--·-..·-··---·-·····.... -._·_·_··••· .."·····..... ,. ........... -.. "••·-···" ........

__

........... - ......· - · - - - -

,G,·

l
2

THE COURT: Okay, then I apologize.

I'm missing

your argument.

3

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well ...

4

THE COURT: On the one hand,

you're saying that you

5

are not asserting it - that is non-hearsay because you're net

6

asserting it for the truth of the matter, right?

7

arguing that?

MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah, can I just give you a series

8
9

You're

of one,

two,

three,

four,

five,

six,

seven, eight,

nine Utah

10

cases that give some examples of matters offered not for the

11

truth?

12

enough issue that, while we're still in trial,

13

at it.

I mean,

I think if it's - at least an important
that we look

14

THE COURT: Okay,

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: They're these - some of these·-

16

let me see them.

some of them don't have a lot of details, but -

17

THE COURT: Has counsel seen that -

18

MR. DELLAPIANA: No.

19

THE COURT: - whatever you're providing me?

20

MR. DELLAPIANA: No,

21

it.

(Inaudible)

he's going to make a copy of

Utah cases.

22

(Inaudible conversation)

23

MR. DELLAPIANA:

By the way,

and I think I can -

co-counsel's pulled up

24

803-3 for me,

like to make a distinction.

25

We'd be offering - so 803-3 says that the statement of the
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1

declarant's state of mind,

2

talking about,

such as motive,

which we're

is -

3

THE COURT: But not including.

4

MR. DELLAPIANA: But not including a statement of

5

memory or belief to prove the fact - remember,

6

prove that she had an affair,

7

that she had an affair,

8

9

but just to show his motive.
Unless

it relates to the validity of terms of a declarant's will.
I'm not trying to prove that she

MR. DELLAPIANA:
had a -

12
13

I'm not providing it to prove

THE COURT: Or to prove the fact believed.

10
11

that is to

THE COURT: You're seeking to introduce it for
purposes of establishing -

1.4

MR. DELLAPIANA: Motive.

15

THE COURT: - the declarant's belief, right?

16

MR. DELLAPIANA:

Motive.

Yeah.

But the fact,

17

remember to believe is that he had believed is that she had

18

an affair.

19

just that that was his belief and this is an exception under

20

rule 803-3,

21

I'm not trying to prove that she had an affair,

goes to his motive.

MR. BOEHM: I don't read 803-3 the same way.

And I

22

think that we need to be careful that we're talking about

23

more than one statement,

24

more complex.

25

of this - this part of the interview, defense counsel wa~1ts

I think,

and so I think it becomes that much
if I'm thinking of the correct part
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1

to get into - and this is where we initially raised the

2

objection,

3

Angela Jenkins,

4

response.

~

~

5 l

~

-.J

·-.:il

·..J

v;j)

...r;)

vJ

he wants to get into what the alleged victim,

Now,

told his client,

and what his client said in

he wants to use that statement to show that

6 I

his client believed something was true,

7

affair,

8

Court has pointed out,

9

the fact remembered. He's not trying to show what his state

that Angela had an

and he's using it in an inappropriate way,
under 803-3,

as the

that he's trying to prove

10

of mind was when he was being interviewed by this detective.

11 i

He's trying to show,

12 I

memory,

13

I think it's clear that it is a statement that's being

14

offered for its truth,

and that it's not being offered to

15

show his - as it says,

then existing state of mind.

or belief,

you know,

this issue of the statement,

to prove the fact remembered or believed.

16

MR.

DELLAPIANA:

17

THE COURT: You may.

18

MR.

DELLAPIANA:

If I can respond to that?

I think,

just within the context of

19

803-3,

20 l

purportedly made by Angela Jenkins.

21 l

- al though I think it's admissible under either the

22

completeness rule or the right to confront witnesses.

23

under 803-3,

24

he'd got in a fight because he thought Angela was cheating on

25

him with his brother Joshua.

I would not be allowed to try to elicit statements
Instead,

I think I

could

But,

I think I can elicit that James indicated that

Whether it's true or not,

I
~57

!
l!

_J
..J

1

that's what he thought and that's his motive for assaulting

2

her.

3

THE COURT:

I guess what I don't see that you're

4

addressing is the second part of 803-3, which says that,

5

not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the

6

fact believed.

7

go and do a little bit more research on that.

8

what I'm focusing on, and I'm not understanding.

Maybe I'm missing this,

but

and maybe I need to
But,

that's

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, I think the fact believed,

9

10

that I'm not trying to prove,

11

affair with his brother.

12

I don't think I can put on Angela - through this rule Angela

13

Jenkins' statements of admitting that she had an affair.

14

can say that he believed it,

15

not offering to prove that it was true,

16

to show his motive.

17

is that Angela Jenkins had an

I think that's - that's why I say,

that that fact is true,

T

.J..

and I'm

just to give -

just

THE COURT: And the second part of that question is,
The - at the time that he is being

18

at which point?

19 ·

interviewed?

20

time of the interview,

21

feeling at the time?

It's the then existing state of mind,
isn't it?

at the

I mean, what - what he was

I don't know.

I'm asking you to -

22

MR. DELLAPIANA: I don't know,

23

THE COURT: - clarify your position - your position

24
25

ii

l

I

I -

in terms of, which period of time are we addressing?

When

he's in the process of being interviewed by Detective Reyes,
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1

or when -

~

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

2

3
4

made.

that's when the statement is

It's a statement of his motive.
THE COURT: So,

i

it's then the then existing,

right?

'~

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, then is a little vague.

5

I

if it's a statement about his existing state of mind,

6

mean,

7

that then existed as the assault -

..J
THE COURT: Okay.

8

It sounds like I better take a

break -

9
10

MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah.

11

THE COURT: - and go see what case law I can pull up

,..;)

12 I

that clarifies that point.

13

MR. DELLAPIANA: Right .

14

MR. BOEHM:

....;J)

v;J

"'

I mean,

I would also like to point out that -

15

well,

I'll let the Court do what it will,

16

we'll respond to that,

and then

and I'll strike my statement.

17

THE COURT: Well -

18

MR. BOEHM: Well,

I

just thi11k that we're trying to

19

mix the words around.

20

to put this testimony in - and there only really two ways.

21 I Angela's deceased.
in fact,

So,

I think that the clear way for defense

she's one party to that.

If i t ' s

22

true,

that his brother had some type of sexual

23

relationship,

24 i

testify to what he was specifically aware of what the

25

defendant might have known about that relationship,

y;j

~

his brother can testify to that.

He can also

if he
159
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1

actually believed that the defendant was aware of that,

or

2

the defendant can take the stand and say what it is that he

3

believed at that point in time,

4

way.

5

rules,

6

testimony, because in this case the statement again is not

7

being offered against him,

8

statements he's obviously - there's a question of the

9

voracity of statements,

and he can put it on that

And I think that this rule,

and all of these hearsay

are designed to make sure and protect the integrity of

at the time that he made those

and so that's the issue here,

10

there's a couple of ways to clear it up,

11

this detective.
MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

12

is

and it's not through

that wasn't very clear,

but

1 _,
...,

-

his argument seems to be that it's not being offered as a

14

statement against a party opponent.

15

argument.

So disregard that.

16

THE COURT: Okay,

17

MR.
four,

18

21

I've got another one.

really left me confused.

20
i

so then your sole basis -

DELLAPIANA: My - so far I've got them up to

THE COURT: Well,

19

then please -

I - now you've

So why don't you make it really

clear what your four bases are?

22

MR.

23

THE COURT: And I will -

24

MR.

25

And I'm not making that

DELLAPIANA: Okay.

DELLAPIANA: Right to confront witnesses under

the Sixth Amendment,

I think I can expose bias -
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1

THE COURT: Okay -

2

MR.

DELLAPIANA: - bias by admission of what I

would

3

characterize as a misrepresentation of statements on direct

4

examination.

5

And I think State versus Cruz Meza - and Meza is

6

regard,

7

statement,

8

directly in - applicable under Rule 106.

9

allows me to introduce the whole of the statement or main

Number two,

Rule of Completeness.

Rule 106.
(inaudible)

which I believe allows me to - this is a recorded
not just a statement of oral recollection,

so it's

I believe that

10

part of it,

11

part that they talk about. Doesn't have to be the same page -

that's brought by opposing party,

12

THE COURT: What's your citation?

13

MR. DELLAPIANA: Cruz Meza.

14

MR. BOEHM:

15

MR.

I think I can give it to the Court -

DELLAPIANA: I

know,

I

got that from the State,

I thought it was very helpful, it's right here.

16

17

MR. BOEHM:

18

THE COURT: Excuse me.

19

relevant to the

What is it?

MR. BOEHM: 76P 30 1165.

I

20

76P 3D 1165.

Utah

(inaudible)

I'm looking if I have a

-

21

THE COURT: Do you have a pinpoint?

22

MR. DELLAPIANA: Weli,

23

MR. BOEHM: I -

I just had note (inaudible).

MR. DELLAPIANA: I mean, it - actually the whole 24
- - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - · ----- -- --------------------------------------t-THE COURT: Okay.

25
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1

MR.

DELLAPIANA: -

almost the entire thing talks

2

about - the bulk of the opinion talks about the Rule of

3

Completeness,

so it's -

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MR. DELLAPIANA: - useful in that regard.

6

THE COURT: Well -

7

MR. BOEHM: Well,

and I would say to the Court that

8

I believe it's a relatively brief opinion, but in my reading

9

of it, and my sharing it with counsel,

I think it - at least

10

reading what the court held,

11

that the trial court acted within its discretion under the

12

doctrine of oral completeness,

13

exculpatory portion of defendant's oral statement in which he

14

explained why he killed the victim.

15

because I ~hought that would be the perfect case if this

16

situation came up.

17

the Supreme Court of Utah held

in refusing to admit

And I brought that

MR. DELLAPIANA: It's a perfect case for me.

The

18

reason the court h3d discretion in that case was because i t

19

was an oral recollection under Rule 611 -

20

MR. BOEHM: May I approach?

21

THE COURT: And it was declined,

22

MR. DELLAPIANA: And not -

23

THE COURT: And it was affirmed -

24

MR. DELLAPIANA: - Rule 106 recorded statements.

25

That's why.

The court

(inaudible).

right?

It's - they said that
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1

doesn't apply in rule 106 cases, and rule - ours is a Rule

2

106 case.

3

THE COURT: All right.

4

MR.

Number

5

three was 803-3,

6

exception under the hearsay rule,

7

defendant's motive, which was that he thought Angela Jenkins

8

was cheating on him with his brother, and I'm offering i t to

9

go to his motive,

10

I believe that the statements goes -

is an

because it goes to the

and not to prove whether Angela was

cheating on him with his brother.

11

..;;

DELLAPIANA: So that was number two.

That's number three.

Number - number four was 801-C-2, this isn't even

12

hearsay, because I'm not offering it for the truth of whether

13

Angela was cheating on his brother,

14

his conduct.

15

we gave a copy to the State, of nine cases - Utah cases where

16

all kinds of extraordinarily prejudicial information was

17

admitted with this exception.

18

and the neighbor said that he'd committed a murder,

19

I

20

Like that kind of information,

-

so I

And there's -

I think,

but to explain

I've given the Court,

I

mean,

"Oh,

went over there to interview him."

I

and I guess

talked to him,
so -

but

Like a fact.

.

under this exception.

21

THE COURT: That's the page you've just given me?

22

MR. DELLAPIANA: Yes.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MR.

25

I said five.

DELLAPIANA: And then,

did I say five - I think

Let me just throw in there - haven't really
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l

thought about this very much,

sorry to say,

but I think it

I
I
I

goes to our right to present a defense,

2

~.

and this is our
I
I

defense.

3

I

So ...
MR. BOEHM: Can I review this,

4

just because I ' l l be

5

looking at the cases while the court is,

6

able to respond,

7

that was the first one. Pursuant to Rule 106 for the

I

think I

I

l

caught the confrontation clause,
~

8

completeness of the statement, that was two. That it's not

9

hearsay because it's not offered for truth,

and therefore not

10

subject to the rules against hearsay,

11

of 801, and then I think the most commonly referred to is

12

that it falls under the exception in 803-3 for motive.

13

that what the Court has?

not being a definition

15

~

Is

"'

THE COURT: And I think he's also based bias,

14

Gt

and hopefully be

presumably under 608 -

16

MR. BOEHM: Okay.

17

THE COURT: - C?

18

MR. BOEHM: All right.

19

THE COURT: I'm assuming.

20

~

Thank you.
He did not give me a

~

specific -

21

MR.

DELLAPIANA: I

22

THE COURT:

like that one.

I don't - it's not my role to provide

you legal bases for your argument,

23

MR. BOEHM: Your Honor,

24

I adopt that one.
~

counsel.

it's apparent to me that -

is there anything else that the defense wanted to raise?

25

G

i

I

I
I
'----····-···----
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Because it's - this sounds like it's going to take a while.

1
2

MR. DELLAPIANA: This is going to -

I mean,

3

seriously look at chis is going to take a while.

4

want to THE COURT:

5

to

We might

I'm thinking that we probably should

just -

6
7

MR. BOEHM: Let the jury go.

8

THE COURT: - release the jury -

9

MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah.

10

THE COURT: -

for today,

because we're going to need

11

to resolve this issue, we also need to deal with jury

12

instructions.

:i.3

MR. BOEHM: Correct.

14

THE COURT: So -

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: Now,

16

sitting there,

17

ask-

because Detective Reyes is

I mear1, the actual questions I was going to

18

THE COURT: Oh (inaudible).

19

MR. BOEHM: We never did get around to that,

guess,

20

I

is that right?

21

MR.

22

THE COGRT: You've got the floor.

23

MR. DELLAPIANA: This part, because we covered

24
25

DELLAPIANA: And this -

everything else,
!

shouldn't take very long.

I mean,

it's

clear the State -

165

1

MR. BOEHM: We're going to stay silent.

2

MR. DELLAPIANA: - objects to this line of

3

questioning.
THE COURT: Well,

4
5

You said,

why

don't we let him put on the record his objections?
MR. DELLAPIANA: And I think appropriately so,

6
7

you did invite it.

~

did

that.
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Dellapiana.

8
9

Q

(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) So we had just - you were

10

talking about how James admitted that he had got in a fight

11

with Angela Jenkins,

right?

12

A

Right.

13

Q

And he told you why,

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Said he started fighting with Angela because he

right?

16

thought she was cheating on him with her - his brother

17

Joshua.

18

A

Correct.

19

Q

And this enraged him.

20

A

Yes.

21

honestly,

I don't know if he used the word enraged,

I -

22

Q

It's in your report,

23

A

Yes, probably.

24

Q

Okay.

though,

right?

And then that's when he slugged her - well,

----··-•·-----·

25

I'll say that that's when he began the assault.
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l

A

Yes.

2

Q

All right.

Now,

he also claimed that she had made

3

some statements, and this is - this goes to a few different

4

pages,

5

that she admitted it and she kept saying it.

6

It's on page 8.

7

A

I'll tell you - you might recall them.

And he said
Remember that?

I remember at first I thought that he just

8

suspected her of it, and so I asked him about that,

9

or he said that she was the one that told him that she was.

10

So but not that -

11

repeating it.

12

Q

I don't remember him saying she kept

okay.

Can you look at page 8 regarding she

kept saying it?

13

14

A

see it.

15
16
17

Oh,

and she -

Q

Yeah,
Yes,

what -

yes.

I'm sorry, what line is that?

I

She did.

And that - then let's jump up to page 19, and you

asked - let me see if I can get you to the line.

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And you say,

20

cheat again,

21

A

Right.

22

Q

Remember that - okay.

23

telling her,

24

wouldn't tell me that.

25 j

..

A

Okay,

and was she telling you she wouldn't

asking you to stop?

please tell me that,

Right.

510.

Like stop the assault?

Then he says,

"No,

but she wouldn't.

I was

She

---+
1

,.. ..,

.LO /

1
2

Q

uAnd that hurt my feelings."

The hurt the feeling statement -

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

- is that right?

5

A

Yeah.

6

Q

Okay.

I didn't hear you

(inaudible).

MR. DELLAPIANA: That's it,

7

8

That's down at 520.

record,

Your Honor.

Let's see.

I think I've made the

Thank you very much for the opportunity.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

9
10

MR. BOEHM: I might have -

11

THE COURT: Why don't we bring in the jury -

12

MR. BOEHM: - a question -

13

THE COURT:

I'm sorry?

14

MR. BOEHM:

I may have a quick question.

15

just ...
THE COURT: Go ahead,

16

19

counsel.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

17
18

Let me

BY MR. BOEHM:
Q

Did the defendant ever tell you that he caught or

20

physically viewed Ms. Jenkins having any type of a

21

relationship with his brother?

22

A

No.

23

Q

And in specific,

when he talked about what enraged

24

him or what got him mad,

25

on him, or was it something else?

--·---·· ·-·----··-·

was it the fact that she had cheated

·---- ... - ·---··-•·•• - - - · · --·-··------·--·-----··----·•···•··••·---·--·-----·-·--··-·•-··•·-

l

A

She was playing games with him,

she said - or,

he -

2

he said that she admitted to him that she had been playing

3

games or cheating with Josh.

4

Q

did the defendant tell you that Josh was there

And,

before this fight began?

5
6

A

No.

7

Q

Okay.

8

nine,

Do you remember in line 238,

Roman numeral 10.01, again,

it's on page

number nine?

9

A

Yeah.

10

Q

Would you just read the statement of the defendant

11

Uh-huh (affirmative).

at that point?

12

MR.

13

DELLAPIANA: Your Honor,

I've lost track

(inaudible).

14

MR. BOEHM: Sorry,

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay.

16

THE WITNESS:

238.

Go ahead and read it?

17

Q

(BY MR. BOEHM) Please.

18

A

nwe were arguing a couple times,

and my brother

19

came, and I kind of pulled her hair and told her not to keep

20

playing games with him,

21

choking her," and then it goes inaudible.

22
23

25

MR. BOEHM: Okay.

That's all

-···------T_H__E_c_o_u_R_T_:_o_k_ay.

All right.

(inaudible).

Started

Thank

you.

:_j

__ .__________2..

and it was over from there.

Let's bring in the

jury and - so that I can inform them that I ' l l be releasing
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them for the day.

1
2

WITNESS:

Do you want me to remain here,

Your Honor?

3

THE COURT: No, you may step down.

4

(Whereupon the jury returned to the courtroom)

5

THE COURT: All right, you may be seated.

Ladies

I am going to need to take some

6

and gentlemen of the jury,

7

time this afternoon to review some matters of law,

8

prepare jury instructions in conjunction with the attorneys.

9

And so,

and jury -

I believe that it is going to take the balance of the

I am going to release you for the day,

10

day today.

11

will begin tomorrow 9:00?

12

more time?

So,

10:00?

and we

Do you think we need a bit

13

MR. DELLAPIANA: If we - well -

I think by -

14

THE COURT: Let's -

15

MR.

16

THE COURT: Let's say 10:00.

17

MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah.

18

THE COURT: Just to make sure that we're not keeping

DELLAPIANA: - 10:00 -

19

you waiting any longer than necessary.

20

return by quarter to 10 tomorrow so again we can get started,

21

hopefully by 10:00 we should be able to be ready to call you

22

in.

23
24
25

1

If there's any difference in that,

through the bailiff.

So,

let me have you

I will let you know

But that way you're not having to wait

for - you know - extended periods of time in the jury room.
So again,

I

am reminding you as I

have at every

170
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l

time we've taken a break, you're not discuss this case with

2

anyone,

3

You're not to attempt to research anything about this case,

4

investigate anything,

5

about this case, nor allow anyone to comment about any

6

reports to you.

7

has been presented to you until all of the evidence has been

8

presented and the matter is turned over to you for

9

deliberation.

you must not listen to any news reports

Do not make up your mind about anything that

10

Please rise for the jury.

11

(Whereupon the jury was excused for the day)

12

THE COURT:

All right.

So, at this point,

counsel,

13

my clerk has printed out a number of the cases that Mr.

14

Dellapiana has cited for me.

15

those as well as Cruz Meza,

and some of the issues of law

16

that we've been discussing.

So we will be in recess for

17

that.

18

jury instructions once we've moved beyond this specific

19

issue.

I am going to be reviewing

I also will need to meet with counsel to address the

MR. DELLAPIANA: And do you want to do the jury

20

21

instructions in the morning or do you want us to wait or come

22

back
I

23

---·---··•···--•.

nor allow anyone to discuss it in your presence.

I

(inaudible) here,

or ...

THE COURT: Well,

it seems to me that I

need to

24 I address this issue first because I
---•·-'.-------··-----··--·--·~--.---·--·-- -···
--•- ··--------------------------·--------r--25 i
I

MR. DELLAPIANA: Absolutely.

I
I
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I
1

2

THE COURT: - the - it's foundational to what the
instructions do or don't include.
MR. DELLAPIANA:

3

I totally agree.
we're

I mean,

it may be

4

that all of the - because right now,

5

back and forth offering alternatives to each other's

6

instructions that would relate to extreme emotional distress

7

instruction and defense,

8

Were you to argue - or were you to conclude that this -

9

of this evidence is admissible -

we've been going

and we haven't reached an agreement.
none

let me just put on the

So, I

10

record - it may be better just to skip that entirely.

11

agree that we need to let - give you time to do your legal

12

review prior to doing instructions.

13
14

I

THE COURT: Okay.

Let's have us reconvene tomorrow

morning at 8:30.

15

MR.

DELLAPIANA: 8:30 is fine.

16

MR. BOEHM: Thank you,

Your Honor.

17

MR. RICKS: Thank you,

Judge.

18

MR. DELLAPIANA:

19

THE COURT: All right.

20

MR. BOEHM: I would just make the record that the

21

State has not rested,

22

stand,

23

the time being.

(Inaudible).

that Detective Reyes,

is not yet released,

24

who took the

but he's released at least for

THE COURT: Just for today.

- - - - - - - i - ... ······-----··-·

25

MR. BOEHM: Yes.
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1

1

THE COCRT: Correct.

2

MR. BOEHM: Thank you,

Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: All right,

thank you.

And if counsel

4

have any brief written argument that you wish to submit,

5

it to me by tomorrow -

6

MR. BOEHM:

7

THE COURT: If you have any brief written argument

I

(inaudible) - I

get

apologize.

8

that you wish to submit on any of these grounds - well,

9

submit whatever argument you wish to make.

10

limit you to a brief argument.

11

submit whatever you have.
MR. BOEHM: May I ask -

12 i

13

this E-filing system,

14

part -

I'm not going to

I'm going to ask you to

I'm still getting used to

and it's led to a couple problems on my

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BOEHM: The Court isn't asking me to E-file

17

something,

I

I -

I'm sorry?

hope.

Can I

just bring it in and print it?

18

THE COURT: Just bring it in to me.

19

MR. BOEHM: Okay,

20

MR. ?: Your Honor, would you like him here at 8:30?

21

THE COURT:

22

23

24
25

1

thank you.

I believe he needs to be - he - counsel?

Do you wish to have Mr. Sanchez here while we're discussing
jury instructions?
MR.

DELLAPIANA: We don't care

(inaudible)

- we need

'·-·-------·----·---·-------------+--

to talk to him now -
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MR. RICKS: We do.

·-·---····--···--·-----~ ..---·•··--·-

We'd need to talk to him right
There's some things we

2

now and we'll make that decision.

3

need to discuss with him (inaudible} -

4
5
6

7

THE COURT: Okay, the question is, when do we want
Mr. Sanchez back tomorrow morning?
MR. DELLAPIANA: Let's have him here,
sure, yeah, that's a good -

?: Thank you.

8

MR.

9

THE COURT: Okay.

10

just to be

Thank you.

(Whereupon the trial was continued}

li

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22

23
24

-c-

25
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2

(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers

3

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

4

P R O C E E D I N G S

5

THE COURT: Good morning.

6

Excuse me, gentlemen.

7

Thank you.
I am way too old to be pulling up all-

Gentlemen,

8

I'll be right back.

nighters which is what I had to do last night.

9

All right.

10

Let - we have various things that I need to rule on.

11

on the record on the matter of State of Utah versus James

12

Raphael Sanchez, case number 111903659.

13

organized here.

14

Okay.

All right.

We are

Let me get myself

I see that there is ...

I want to address first the motion for

15

mistrial.

16

deny the motion.

17

improper statement was not intentionally elicited, was made

18

in passing, and in the context of all the testimony

19

presented, is relatively innocuous.

20

State versus Allen,

21

Having fully considered Mr. Sanchez's arguments,

I

A mistrial is not required where an

103 P 3 rd

-

And there I'm relying on

I'm sorry,

108 P 3 rd 730,

with

a pinpoint at 738 I

l

22 !

MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, before you go into your

I

23

I analysis, there was - we didn't really make part of our

24

I
I

record about our argument for the mistrial, and it's not on
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

·---------·-·-···--··-- --2 5 -r-----the record,

I think the j ur~

~-·;---~-~~~·-·-·-=·· we

- - - - - - - - - -

I

mentioned it at ~-h~-----·- -----(....

l
1

·---------

_;;;
. -·

····--,
I

..J

~

J

...;)

..:,)

··.d

-.a

.-.:::)

...J

l

bench, but I'd like to say one thing about the juror's note

2 !

because I don't think we put that on record when we were

3

arguing previously for the mistrial.

4

minute,

This will only take a

if I may.

5

THE COURT: Go ahead.

6

MR. DELLAPIANA: We did - I think the last time we

7

argued,

it was after we came back from lunch yesterday,

8 i

we brought up the fact that we had got notice of a headline

9 l

where they said it - accused says,

ur

think I might've killed

10

her this time."

11 ·

assertion that just because the media picked up on that,

12

didn't mean that the jury picked up on it.

1

The Court made a -

well, perhaps that's true,

13

and

I think a reasonable

And I thought,

at least until we got the

14

i

subsequent question from the jury, which was,

15

1

the effect, has the defendant assaulted her before,
And then,

as I recall,

to

or

16

something to that effect.

I think we knew,

I

think

17 I

without any doubt at all,

18 !

by the jury, and I think considered together with the prior

19 !

inadmissible evidence that came in,

20

strong probability of prejudice to the defendant in this

21

case.

that the matter was not overlooked

shows that there's a

That's all.

22

MR. BOEHM: May I -

23

THE COURT: l respectfully disagree.

24

MR. BOEHM: And may I respond just (inaudible)?

25

THE COURT: You may respond.

·- j ____ .

2
··.,:)
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r ....
I
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i
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1

MR. BOEHM: The question that was asked by the

jury

2

about any prior assaults wasn't asked yesterday - or excuse

3

me,

4

was elicited.

5

concerning testimony.

6

during Detective Reyes - at the close of Detective Reyes'

7

testimony.

8

Reyes himself knew of anything,

9

that that was not proper,

it wasn't asked on Tuesday when the concerning testimony
It wasn't asked of the witness who gave the
It was asked yesterday on Wednesday

And I think it was specific to whether Detective
and the Court instructed them

that couldn't come in.

The fact

10

that he was asking Detective Reyes means he may want to know

11

if there was something,

12

that he doesn't know means that there's nothing for them to

13

consider.

but he didn't know.

And the fact

THE COURT: And I think Mr. Boehm has summarized it

14
15

just, probably better than I would have.

The basis for why I

16

don't believe that the note from the juror that arose at the

17

near conclusion of Detective Reyes's testimony,

18

could be considered to relate back to the statement made by

19

the - effectively the first or second witness in this case.

20

In -

21

at State versus Decorso,

22

to grant mistrials when witnesses made improper references to

23

i

I've looked at State versus Walk,

in any way,

I've looked

in all of these the court declined

crimes that the defendant had allegedly committed,

and in

.::+-::::~:-::e~yt::-.r-:::::;\b:~~;~~:~~=:a-:-?-~-:-:/e:::n::~::--~--- · · · - · -· · · 3

,

didn't he tell you that,

.I.

l

I think I might have killed her?

2

That's a question that simply required a yes or no answer.

3

At that point Mr. Warner then,

I

I
i

I

4

statement that added the - at this - you know,

5

The statement,

6

conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Warner, was given the

7

opportunity to ask questions of Mr. Warner.

8

there any question that was - that picked up or responded to

9

any suggestion that arguably could've come from that

11

been present in the minds of the jury,

12

time when that question would've been expected,

13

conclusion of the State's case a day later.

It seems to me that if the issue had
that would've been the
not at the

I must consider the totality of the

15

evidence that has been admitted,

16

extensive admissions by the defendant himself.

17

that the statement was made in passing,

18

by either counsel or the Court, the matter moved on,

19

compared to the totality of the evidence,

20

error,

including most notably the
Considering

it was not dwelt upon

and when

it is - if it was

it was at best harmless error.

21

---·•-·

at the

In no way was

volunteered statement.

Additionally,

!

I

uthis time.n

as has been noted, the jury thereafter,

10

14

--~➔

you know, volunteered the

Now,

the defense has sought to introduce,

through

22

the testimony of Detective Reyes,

evidence regarding certain

23

statements made by the defendant,

I am understanding,

24

assuming,

25

asserting the special mitigation defense of extreme emotional

or I'm

for the purpose of establishing a basis for

·- -

4
l

! ----•·--·-··-·-········ -·--···-- ....... ······-·---.. .-..... ·······-·······-·- ··•···-······-·····-·--··--·-·---·---····-···---··--·---··---
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l
'i

..L

distress.

2

statements either allegedly made by the victim,

3

admitting or suggesting that she'd been involved sexually

4

with the defendant's brother, and/or defendant's own

5

statements of his belief that the victim was having sexual

6

relations with his brother.

7

various alternative grounds for why that testimony should be

8

heard by the jury.

9

failure to allow that evidence violates the Sixth Amendment

. ----~ -•·· .... - .. ,

either

The defense counsel has offered

Specifically,

the defense contends that

Confrontation Clause,

11

the Rule of Completeness and/or Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of

12

Evidence,

13

be 608C,

14

hearsay statement under 801C2,

15

for the truth of the matter asserted,

16

falls within the then existing state of mind exception under

17

Rule 803-3.

that the testimony is admissible under

under some unspecified rule,

which I understood to

to show bias on the detective's part; as a nonbecause it's not being offered
or as hearsay that

I have considered each of these grounds separately,

J. 9

and I conclude that none of them form a basis for allowing

20

introduction of that testimony.

21

consideration,

22

by the defense and provided to me,

23

research.

·-···--··'·•·•-•-·~· ·-

25

In making that

I have read all of the cases that were cited
as well as my own

With respect to the Sixth Amendment argument,

24
'~--

the defense wishes to introduce

10

18

-·· ' - .

Specifically,

the

T

Confrontation Clause speaks to the defendant's right to be

--·--·········- ----·-·••"·-···-------·-----······--·····--···--·---···-·•·-··-··-·

5
•-

... -

·•·••

................ •"·--·-·-••··

-••·-·----.. --- . . . . . . .

-------·· ·-·----'

1

confronted with witnesses against him.

2

seeking to elicit his own exculpatory statements through the

3

detective,

4

not the statements of a witness against him.

5

that he's seeking to elicit statements he attributes to the

6

decedent,

7

falls under an exception was cited.

8

unable to benefit from the victim's unavailability,

9

his own admission he created, and the alleged statements

10

would not fall within any of the exceptions to Rule 804.

on its face it is clear that his statements are
To the extent

they would at best be double hearsay,
At worst,

none of which
he would be
that by

As to his arguments about - based on the - it was

11

..)

To the extent he is

12

originally cited as the Rule of Completeness.

13

discuss it under both Rrule of Completeness and 106, because

14

the defense subsequently submitted a document making a case

15

under 106.

16

Our Supreme Court has held that, where the oral - and i t ' s a

17

strictly oral statement,

18

the Rule of Completeness may apply under Rule 611.

19

not argued to the Court.

20

put forward with respect to Rule 611.

21

Rule of Completeness does not apply in a case like this one

22

where,

23

contemporaneously recorded interview,

24

!

But I will

The Rule of Completeness is a common law rule.

it's not been reduced to writing,

And certainly no analysis has been

what we have at issue,

transcribed,

That was

But,

in any event,

the

is the defendant's
which was then

and in State versus Leleae,

I'm not pronouncing

-1

25

!

that correctly,

but it's L-E-L-E-A-E,

993 P 3 rd 232.

In that
6

\.._,
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l

case,

2

defendant.

3

then transcribed.

4

against interest were introduced through the detective.

5

court found that, although the defendant's oral statement was

6

1

the - a detective conducted an interview with the
The defendant's statements were tape recorded and
At trial, the defendant's statements
The

introduced through the detective, the statements were

7

recorded and transcribed, and Rule 106 applied - actually,

8

were sought to be introduced.

9

denial of the defense's motion to introduce the entire

The appellate court upheld the

10

statement of the defendant for the purpose of, quote,

11

"putting the prosecution's requested portion in context.n

12

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not abused

13

its discretion,

14

included - excluded.

15

and decided that this statement should be

In this case, as in that - and that one, the

16

defendant's oral statement during his interview with

17

Detective Reyes was recorded and transcribed.

18

fall within 106, and not under the Rule of Completeness

19

referenced by the defense in its argument initially.

20

106, the Court must apply a fairness standard in evaluating

21

the need for admitting the remainder of a written or recorded

22

statement.

23

only those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify,

24

explain, or place into context the portion that has already

And under that standard,

As such,

been introduced.

Under

the court needs to admit

--------·---------·------

25

they

---·r-·-·-··1

i

Here, the defendant seeks to admit
7

------·----------------•···-------··-····--·-··--------------·--

,.;;

1

statements that are essentially a self-serving, after-the-

2 I

fact explanation for his conduct in assaulting the victim,

3 I

and that portion of that overall interview was temporally

4

removed from the inculpatory statements that had been

5 i

received without objection on the basis of 801-B-2.

-.d

. ..J

I conclude that the fairness analysis does not

6

-.J

7

require the admission of the statements offered to explain

8

the reasons for his brutal assault on the victim.
Now,

9
-.JP

,d

...)

10

Meza in support of his claim that the statement should be

11

received.

12

of his murder to a third person, which was an oral statement.

13

There the trial court analyzed it essentially under the

14

common law rule and excluded it on the basis that the

15

statements were not made spontaneously,

16

indicia of trustworthiness or reliability.

17 l

upheld the trial court's exercise of its discretion.

18 I
..,:)

..J

I disagree.

In any event,

In Cruz Meza, the defendant confessed

and lacked the
The Supreme Court

I believe Cruz Meza is

19

distinguishable, because the statement at issue was a

20

strictly oral statement, and the admissibility analysis was

21

made under the common law Rule of Completeness,

22

103, which the defense has now made clear it is - that is the

23 !

sole basis that it is proceeding under.

25
THE COURT:

I'm sorry,

106.

not under

l
i

i

!

Ia::10:ize_: _ - .1

MR. DELLAPIANA: You mean 106?

24
_:)

initially the defense cited State versus Cruz

Or -

i

.. -f·I

8

l'------~--------.. .d

1

MR.

2

THE COURT:

3

Now,

DELLAPIANA: Oh.
I mis-spoke.

I will note that that last analysis or

4

statement submitted by the defense was done as,

5

reply to the State's motion in limine.

6

I had stricken the State's motion,

7

motion in limine because it had been untimely filed.

8

there really was nothing to reply to.

9

counsel to submit any additional briefing, which the State

10

has now provided,

11

yesterday evening.

12

quote,

a

I remind counsel that

and had not considered the

But,

So

I had invited

and which the defense provided to me

I also find no merit in the argument that the

13

defendant's statement must be received presumably under Rule

14

608C to show the detective's alleged bias.

15

certainly not pointed to any specific facts that would

16

support or show that Detective Reyes's testimony was simply

17

factually reported on the defendant's inculpatory statements,

18

is in any way tainted by bias.

19

nothing more than a straightforward response to questions put

20

to him by both the prosecution and the defense.

21

The defense has

The detective's testimony was

I similarly reject their claim that the statement

22

is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted,

23

and therefore it's not hearsay.

24

explanatory statement is,

If the defendant's

in fact,

not being offered for the

-----·-··--·-··--······-··..-·-••··-•-··---··-•·-••·--···-·-··-···-·--·-···----···--········-·-•--·---

25

truth of the matter asserted,

then the defense has failed to
9

...:;)
-----·

1 !

articulate its relevance.

2 I

irrelevant evidence is not admissible.

And,

as such,

under Rule 402,

-.d

3 I

·..d

-..J
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..J
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Finally,

the defense asserts that the statements

~

are admissible under the hearsay exception to Rule 803-3 as

5 i

evidence of the defendant's motive for acting as he did and

6 !

assaulting the victim.

7 ,

closer call.

8

defendant challenged the admission of his hearsay statement,

9 I

that if his wife ever left him he would kill her.

I will admit that this one was a much

In State v.

(inaudible),

780 P 2 nd 1221,

the

The Utah

10

Supreme Court held that the trial court had not erred in

11

admitting the statement,

12

the statement certainly reflected the defendant's mental

13

state,

14

based on that statement.

15

state the rule that hearsay evidence that shows the

16

defendant's mental state prior to the commission of a er ~·_me

17

is admissible under 803-3,

18 l

circumstances that indicate its reliability,

19

to show intent,

20

defendant's state of mind is at issue in the case,

21:

relevant to prove or explain acts or conducts of the

22

defendant.

23

inculpatory statement that arguably could've also come in

24

under Rule 801-0-2 as a non-hearsay statement being offered

because it was relevant to the -

and

and the jury could infer his intent to murder his wife
And,

the court did

if the statement was made under

planned motive,

Notably,

in that case,

and is relevant

when the State's
or is

the statement at issue in Debello was an

- ·- •----.
-•

25

against a party opponent.
10
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1

Similarly,

754 P 2 r.d 935,

2

the court admitted under Rule 803-3 that hearsay statements

3

of the decedent to a third party shortly before her death to

4

the effect that the defendant had threatened her life.

5

court held those statements were admissible as evidence of

6

the decedent's state of mine.

7

on State versus Wauneka - Wauneka -

8

it -

9

generally enunciated rules of admissibility of out of court

it's W-A-U-N-E-K-A,

The

In doing so, the state relied
I'm not sure how to spell

560 P 2~d 13677, where the court

10

statements made by a homicide victim who reported threat~, of

11

death or serious bodily injury made by the defendant.

12

In this case, the defendant is seeking to admit his

13

arguably exculpatory or self-serving statement on the basis

14

that it is relevant to show his motive or to explain his

15

conduct.

16

failed to meet the first part of the Debello test,

17

that he has failed to show that the statement was made under

18

circumstances that indicate its reliability and

19

trustworthiness.

Even if this were true, however,

More recently,

20

-

in State versus Auble,

the defendant has
which is

in State versus Marchette, the

21

defense sought to introduce under 803-3 hearsay exculpatory

22

statements that he had made in a phone call to a victim of

23

sexual assault in that case.

24

set up a scripted, recorded,

\._..

The investigating detectiv12 had
pretext call between the

-········-····-• ...............---·-·-··------·------

25

defendant and the victim,

and his statements during that call
11

~--

----••··•········-······-······---·······-·--

···---·---···--------

----------·--~

1

demonstrated his belief that the victim had consented.

2

Marchette's statements in that recorded telephone call were

3

made several days after the charged event occurred,

4

court concluded did not amount to evidence of his state of

5

mind as it existed during his encounter with the victim.

6

trial court declined to admit the inculpatory statement as

7

inadmissible hearsay,

The

and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

In this case,

8

and the

although the defendant's exclamatory

statement was made the day following the event at issue,

9

10

rather than several days later,

11

reassure the Court of the trustworthiness of the statement,

12

and the defendant has not offered anything to support the

13

conclusion that the statement is trustworthy.

14

have already indicated, the statement is an after-the-fact

15

explanation that seeks to minimize his culpability for his

16

admitted conduct towards the victim.

17

Supreme Court has recognized situations under which certain

18

hearsay statements that reflect state of mind are properly

19

admissible,

20

situations.

21

that by itself does not

Thus,

Rather,

although the

the Court concludes that this is not one of those

Finally,

even though I'm not accepting any of the

22

grounds that have been proffered by the defense for

23

admissibility of the testimony,

j

as I

I'm not sure that the defense

-----·--··-·······---··· ··----·----·--------··-•·-·------··---·--·-·---·----····-- - - - - -
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1

it would certainly open the door for the defense -

2

prosecution to then put on all the evidence of the

3

defendant's prior convictions for his assaultive behavior on

4

the very same victim just a few weeks prior, which would've

5

totally undercut his emotional - extreme emotional distress

6

defense - special mitigation,

7

character, extreme, overwrought, emotional response to a

8

triggering event.

9

to even go there.

10

But,

....

--,

for the

that this was an out of

since I'm denying it, we don't need

Given that conclusion, however,

I do not need to

11

address jury instructions having to do with extreme emotional

12

distress because, at this point - and I will invite Mr.

13

Dellapiana to make a record of this - I am not persuaded that

14

there is sufficient cognizable evidence to present that

15

defense to a jury.

16

Dellapiana,

17

what evidence he believes - cognizable,

18

that is already a matter of record, that would allow this

19

matter to go to the jury, you're welcome to make that record.

But I would certainly invite Mr.

if he believes that he wants to make a record of
admissible evidence,

MR. DELLAPIANA: Your Honor, based on your rulings,

20

21

there is none.

I don't think that without that evidence,

22

defense has a basis to argue special mitigation.

23

THE COURT: All right.

24

MR. DELLAPIANA: I do have an alternative defense

the

So now ··--·-·-- ··-·· .. ------·····-·•--··-•--·- --·······.. -····-··-- ----··-··-·· .. ···•--.•--···--··

I'd like to file a requested instruction for,

25

I
l

I
l.---·-···--·---···--------

however.
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